无意识过程

J. Kihlstrom
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引用次数: 16

摘要

意识与精神生活的两个方面有关:监控我们自己,这样我们的经历、思想和行为就能被现象性的意识所感知;控制我们自己,参与自愿行为超越反射,本能和条件反应。潜意识是否存在,如果存在,它的范围和限制是什么,自科学心理学开始以来一直是一个重要的理论问题。当然,在某种意义上,有许多物理和生物过程是无意识地进行的:行星绕太阳运行和光合作用就是两个例子。血压的变化是无法被感知到的;而产生意识的大脑活动本身是在无意识中进行的(神经外科医生向我们保证,大脑中没有感应)。但如果同一事物不能被有意识,也就是说不能被现象意识和自愿控制,那么谈论无意识就没有什么意义了。因此,形容词无意识只有在用于心理状态和心理活动时才有意义,作为与有意识相对的形容词。这些心理状态有多种形式——即认知(感知、记忆、思想和通过学习获得的知识)、情绪(积极和消极的感受)和动机(接近和回避的欲望和目标)。通常,这些心理状态是可以被意识感知到的,因为人们通常意识到他们在想什么,他们想要什么,感觉什么,以及他们在做什么。“无意识”是内省现象意识和自愿控制无法达到的精神状态和过程的简称。问题是,在现象意识和自愿控制的范围之外,精神状态是否可以存在(以及精神活动发生),以及在多大程度上可以存在。反对意见:如果这些心理状态和活动是无意识的,我们怎么知道它们?回答:我们通过它们对我们持续的意识体验、思想和行动的影响间接地认识它们。问题:如果有两种心理状态和过程,有意识的和无意识的,它们是如何比较和对比的?答:原则上,无意识过程不同于有意识过程,因为它们在现象意识之外运作。因为有意识的意识是有意识控制的逻辑前提;无意识过程不受自愿自我调节的影响。有意识和无意识过程之间的其他区别是经验问题。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Unconscious Processes
Consciousness has to do with two aspects of mental life: monitoring ourselves, so that our experiences, thoughts, and actions are accessible to phenomenal awareness; and controlling ourselves, engaging in voluntary behavior that goes beyond reflex, instinct, and conditioned response. The unconscious mind—whether it exists at all, and if so what its scope and limits are—has been an important theoretical issue since the beginning of scientific psychology. There are of course many physical and biological processes that, in some sense, proceed unconsciously: the orbiting of planets around the sun and photosynthesis are two examples. Changes in blood pressure are not accessible to phenomenal awareness; and the brain activity which gives rise to consciousness itself goes on unconsciously (neurosurgeons assure us that there is no afference in the brain). But there is little point in talking about something being unconscious if that same thing cannot also be conscious, in the sense of being accessible to phenomenal awareness and voluntary control. Therefore, the adjective unconscious only makes sense when applied to mental states and mental activity, as an adjectival contrast to conscious. These mental states come in various forms—namely cognition (percepts, memories, thoughts, and knowledge acquired through learning), emotion (positive and negative feelings), and motivation (desires and goals of approach and avoidance). Usually, these mental states are accessible to consciousness, in that people are generally aware of what they are thinking, what they want and feel, and what they are doing. “The unconscious” is shorthand for mental states and processes that are inaccessible to introspective phenomenal awareness and voluntary control. The question is whether, and to what extent, mental states can exist (and mental activities transpire) outside the scope of phenomenal awareness and voluntary control. Objection: If these mental states and activities are unconscious, how are we to know them? Answer: We know them indirectly by virtue of their effects on our ongoing conscious experience, thought, and action. Question: If there are two kinds of mental states and processes, conscious and unconscious, how do they compare and contrast? Answer: In principle, unconscious processes differ from conscious processes because they operate outside phenomenal awareness. And because conscious awareness is the logical prerequisite for conscious control; unconscious processes are not susceptible to voluntary self-regulation. Other differences between conscious and unconscious processes are empirical questions.
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