最优货币政策总是最优的吗?

Troy A. Davig, R. Gürkaynak
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引用次数: 22

摘要

不。并不是你想的那样。在一个多重低效的世界里,央行控制的单一政策工具不会消除所有的低效;这是很容易理解的。我们认为,多重低效率和具有不同目标的多重政策制定者是世界的更好特征。只从最优货币政策的角度来提出政策问题,实际上把央行变成了所有政策的剩余索取者,并让其他政策制定者在追求自己的目标时自由行动。这进一步加剧了央行面临的权衡。最优货币政策文献和最优简单规则通常被称为灵活的通货膨胀目标制,它们将所有的周期性政策制定职责都赋予了央行。这扭曲了策略讨论,并将策略选择缩小到次优集合。我们强调这一问题,并呼吁对最佳政策进行更广泛的思考。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Is Optimal Monetary Policy Always Optimal?
No. And not only for the reason you think. In a world with multiple inefficiencies the single policy tool the central bank has control over will not undo all inefficiencies; this is well understood. We argue that the world is better characterized by multiple inefficiencies and multiple policy makers with various objectives. Asking the policy question only in terms of optimal monetary policy effectively turns the central bank into the residual claimant of all policy and gives the other policymakers a free hand in pursuing their own goals. This further worsens the tradeoffs faced by the central bank. The optimal monetary policy literature and the optimal simple rules often labeled flexible inflation targeting assign all of the cyclical policymaking duties to central banks. This distorts the policy discussion and narrows the policy choices to a suboptimal set. We highlight this issue and call for a broader thinking of optimal policies.
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