{"title":"开放固件的恶意代码检测","authors":"F. Adelstein, M. Stillerman, D. Kozen","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.2002.1176312","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Malicious boot firmware is a largely unrecognized but significant security risk to our global information infrastructure. Since boot firmware executes before the operating system is loaded, it can easily circumvent any operating system-based security mechanism. Boot firmware programs are typically written by third-party device manufacturers and may come from various suppliers of unknown origin. We describe an approach to this problem based on load-time verification of onboard device drivers against a standard security policy designed to limit access to system resources. We also describe our ongoing effort to construct a prototype of this technique for open firmware boot platforms.","PeriodicalId":389487,"journal":{"name":"18th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, 2002. Proceedings.","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2002-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"40","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Malicious code detection for open firmware\",\"authors\":\"F. Adelstein, M. Stillerman, D. Kozen\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/CSAC.2002.1176312\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Malicious boot firmware is a largely unrecognized but significant security risk to our global information infrastructure. Since boot firmware executes before the operating system is loaded, it can easily circumvent any operating system-based security mechanism. Boot firmware programs are typically written by third-party device manufacturers and may come from various suppliers of unknown origin. We describe an approach to this problem based on load-time verification of onboard device drivers against a standard security policy designed to limit access to system resources. We also describe our ongoing effort to construct a prototype of this technique for open firmware boot platforms.\",\"PeriodicalId\":389487,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"18th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, 2002. Proceedings.\",\"volume\":\"40 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2002-12-09\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"40\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"18th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, 2002. Proceedings.\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.2002.1176312\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"18th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, 2002. Proceedings.","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.2002.1176312","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Malicious boot firmware is a largely unrecognized but significant security risk to our global information infrastructure. Since boot firmware executes before the operating system is loaded, it can easily circumvent any operating system-based security mechanism. Boot firmware programs are typically written by third-party device manufacturers and may come from various suppliers of unknown origin. We describe an approach to this problem based on load-time verification of onboard device drivers against a standard security policy designed to limit access to system resources. We also describe our ongoing effort to construct a prototype of this technique for open firmware boot platforms.