不确定性下的正当性

Volodymyr Navrotskyi
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引用次数: 1

摘要

信仰的形成和信仰的证明是认识论、心灵哲学和行动哲学的主题。在本文中,我们最感兴趣的是应用分析技术来解释不确定条件下的信念证明。我们需要解释这一现象,以便至少部分地回答,在引起怀疑的条件下推理的特征是什么,人们如何在这种条件下做出决定。为这种决定辩护的论据具有似是而非的论据的地位。与似是而非的论证的分析和评价有关的关键问题是前提的可接受性以及它们的可接受性向结论的传递。在这篇文章中,我们关注的是似是而非的论证从前提到结论的过渡,以及从前提到结论的证明的传递。为了确定这种传输的特点,我们提出了这种论点的语义学大纲。它的关键组成部分是对前提的合理性和推理规则的度量。一个貌似有理的论点本身并不能提供接受其结论的最终理由。结论的正当性还取决于支持或反对它的其他论据。因此,为了建立结论的证明程度,我们需要将权重赋给前提和推理规则。我们希望这项研究至少能提供一个初步的答案,来回答在似是而非的论证中证明传递的失败与演绎论证中的证明传递的失败有何不同。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Justification under uncertainty
Belief formation and justification of belief is the subject of epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of action. In this article we are mostly interested in the application of analytic techniques for the explication of belief justification under uncertainty. We need to explicate this phenomenon in order to answer, at least in part, the question of what are the features of reasoning made in conditions that cause doubts, how people make decisions in such conditions. Arguments used for the justification of such decisions have the status of plausible arguments. The crucial issues related to the analysis and evaluation of plausible arguments are of the acceptability of the premises and the transmission of their acceptability to the conclusion. In this article, we have focused on the transition from the premises to the conclusions of plausible arguments, on the transmission of justification of premises to the conclusions. To establish the peculiarities of such a transmission an outline of the semantics for such arguments is proposed. Its key component is the measures of the plausibility of the premises and rules of inference. A plausible argument itself does not provide the ultimate reason for accepting its conclusion. The justification of the conclusion also depends on other arguments that support or defeat it. So to establish the degree of justification of the conclusion we need to attribute the weights to the premises and rules of inference. We hope that this study provides at least a preliminary answer to the question of how the failure of the transmission of justification in plausible arguments differs from the failure of transmission in deductive arguments.
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