专名指称:描述性与因果性研究

Elizaveta Speshilova
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摘要

本文从分析哲学的角度探讨专名的语义问题。作者对现有的专名指称问题的研究方法(描述指称说和直接指称说)进行了分类和分析,并揭示了它们相互交叉的点。在简要界定了描述理论的主要论点后,作者提出区分描述理论的强版本和弱版本。根据主要由弗雷格(G. Frege)和拉塞尔(B. Russell)的作品提出的强版本,名称实际上是一种伪装的描述(或描述的结合),而根据可追溯到塞尔(J. Searle)的作品的弱版本,名称与描述的复杂脱节有关。在第一种和第二种情况下,都是描述指定了名称的表示;换句话说,名称只是间接地指示对象。然而,这种方法至少没有考虑到使用“虚假”描述来命名对象的可能性,也就是说,一个描述指定了对象不对应的特征。在直接指称理论中,专有名称的语义以一种根本不同的方式被解释,根据直接指称理论,名称是对象的标签。在这种情况下,名称的引用要么是通过因果链的交流(S. Kripke)来确定的,要么是通过对使用该名称的人与该名称所指定的单数对象之间关系的历史解释来确定的(K. Donnellan)。名称本身被理解为一个严格的指示符,在任何事实或反事实的情况下直接和严格地指向同一对象。这种方法允许我们展示,例如,如何使用不正确的描述来引用某个主题。通过对这些理论的比较研究,可以发现描述性指称理论中因果方面的存在和直接指称理论中描述性特征的意义,从而更准确地描述专有名称的语义。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
On Reference of Proper Names: Descriptive and Causal Approaches
The article considers the semantics of proper names in the context of analytical philosophy. The author classifies and analyzes the existing approaches to the issue of proper names reference (the descriptive theory of reference and the direct reference theory) and also reveals the points of their mutual intersection. After briefly defining the main theses of descriptive theory, the author proposes to distinguish its strong version from the weak one. According to the strong version, presented primarily by the works of G. Frege and B. Russell, the name, in fact, is a disguised description (or conjunction of descriptions), while, according to the weak version, dating back to the works of J. Searle, a name is associated with a complex disjunction of descriptions. In both the first and second cases, it is the descriptions that specify the denotation of the name; in other words, the name indicates the object only indirectly. However, this approach, at least, does not take into account the possibility of naming an object using a ‘false’ description, that is, a description that specifies the characteristic(s) to which the object does not correspond. The semantics of proper names is interpreted in a fundamentally different way in direct reference theory, according to which names are labels for objects. The reference of the name in this case is determined either with the help of a causal chain of communication (S. Kripke), or with the help of a historical explanation of the relationship between the one who uses the name and the singular object that is designated by that name (K. Donnellan). The name itself is understood as a rigid designator, directly and strictly pointing to the same object in any factual or counterfactual situation. This approach allows us to show how, for example, it is possible to use an incorrect description to refer to a certain subject. The comparative study of these theories made it possible to discover the presence of causal aspects in the descriptive theory of reference and the significance of descriptive characteristics in the direct reference theory, and thereby more accurately describe the semantics of proper names.
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