投资与伪装

Anita K. Krug
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摘要

《多德-弗兰克法案》监管改革的一个重要组成部分是第七章,规定对被称为互换的场外衍生品进行监管。尽管《多德-弗兰克法案》颁布后,这一规定立即引起了很多争议,但商品期货交易委员会(CFTC)随后根据第七章的授权采用的许多规则却并非如此。本文是第一篇批判性地评估CFTC“掉期规则”并确定其反映的监管愿景的学术著作。基于这一评估,它认为互换规则的基础是互换与另一种金融市场工具(即证券)之间的显著区别。特别是,虽然“投资”是证券交易的标志,但掉期交易属于“假装”的范畴,本文采用这个概念来阐明掉期的功能和结构。毕竟,互换的价值是基于一种与互换本身完全无关的资产——“参考资产”。互换的每一方都假装持有参考资产的多头头寸或空头头寸,根据该头寸的表现向另一方付款(或从另一方收取付款)。然而,正如文章进一步指出的那样,尽管投资和假装之间的区别生动地反映在CFTC制定掉期规则的方法中,但这种区别与监管目的无关。此外,CFTC基于借口的掉期监管方法所产生的大量监管成本可能会过度阻碍掉期的使用,因为寻求降低风险的公司在使用掉期可能更有利于社会的情况下转向其他类型的对冲策略。考虑到有效和连贯的监管目标,文章提出,对CFTC的掉期规则来说,一个更好的方法是,不把它们作为投资的对立物,而是基于掉期交易和证券交易的共同之处——以及证券监管的基础:投机产生的风险。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Investing and Pretending
One of the more prominent components of Dodd-Frank’s regulatory changes was Title VII, providing for the regulation of the over-the-counter derivatives known as swaps. Although there was much ado about that regulation immediately after Dodd-Frank’s enactment, the same cannot be said of the many rules that the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) has subsequently adopted pursuant to its authority under Title VII. This Article is the first scholarly work to critically evaluate the CFTC’s “swap rules” and to identify the regulatory vision that they reflect. Based on that evaluation, it argues that the swap rules are grounded in a notable distinction between swaps and another financial market instrument — namely, securities. In particular, whereas “investing” is the hallmark of securities transactions, swap transactions fall under the rubric of “pretending,” a concept that this Article employs to elucidate the function and structure of swaps. After all, the value of a swap is based on an asset — the “reference asset” — that is wholly unrelated to the swap itself. Each party to a swap pretends that it holds either a long position or a short position in the reference asset, making payments to (or receiving payments from) the other party based on the performance of that position. Yet, as the Article further contends, although the distinction between investing and pretending is vividly reflected in the CFTC’s approach to crafting the swap rules, the distinction is irrelevant for regulatory purposes. Moreover, the substantial regulatory costs arising from the CFTC’s pretense-based approach to swap regulation are likely to excessively hinder swap use, as firms seeking to mitigate risk turn to other types of hedging strategies in situations in which using swaps would otherwise be more socially beneficial. With the goal of efficient and coherent regulation in mind, the Article proposes that a substantially better approach to the CFTC’s swap rules would be to predicate them not on pretending, as the counterpoint to investing but, rather, on something that swap transactions and securities transactions have in common — and on which securities regulation, too, is based: the risks arising from speculation.
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