一厢情愿的投资者对中小企业网络借贷业务的影响

Guang-Xin Gao, X. Fang, Yun Fong Lim
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引用次数: 1

摘要

在线点对点(P2P)贷款已迅速成为传统银行融资的替代方案。与传统融资模式不同,P2P网络借贷的借款人,通常是中小型企业,通过一个平台从多个投资者那里获得资金。在承担借款人破产风险的同时,许多投资者表现得一厢情愿,他们只关注获得高回报,而忽视了他们的投资风险。我们通过博弈论模型研究了一厢情愿的投资者对P2P网络借贷的影响。在这种模式下,P2P借贷平台首先设定利率并收取佣金。面对不确定的需求,资金紧张的中小企业决定产品的订购数量,并通过平台进行贷款。平台上的每个投资者,可能是一厢情愿的,也可能是保守的,都可以决定投资多少。通过识别参与者的均衡策略,我们发现一厢情愿的投资者比保守的投资者更积极地投资。随着一厢情愿的投资者比例的增加,平台降低了利率,中小企业的订单数量增加,借贷资金增加。这降低了中小企业成功偿还贷款的可能性,这令人担忧地表明,一厢情愿的投资者通过影响中小企业的经营决策,使网络P2P借贷风险更大。一项进一步的调查显示,一厢情愿的投资者增加了平台和中小企业的预期利润,这与投资者不太成熟的地区网络P2P借贷的快速增长相呼应。然而,当一厢情愿的投资者增多时,每个投资者的预期收益就会减少。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Impact of Wishful-thinking Investors in Online Peer-to-Peer Lending on SMEs' Operations
Online peer-to-peer (P2P) lending has rapidly emerged as an alternative to traditional bank financing. In contrast to traditional financing models, a borrower in online P2P lending, typically a small- and medium-size enterprise (SME), receives funds from multiple investors through a platform. While bearing the borrower's bankruptcy risk, many investors behave as wishful thinkers, who focus only on getting high returns but ignore their investment risk. We study the impact of wishful-thinking investors in online P2P lending through a game-theoretical model. In this model, a P2P lending platform first sets an interest rate and charges a commission. Facing uncertain demand, a capital-constrained SME then decides her order quantity of a product and borrows a loan through the platform. Each investor on the platform, who can be wishful-thinking or conservative, decides how much to invest. By identifying the players' equilibrium strategies, we find that the wishful-thinking investors invest more aggressively than the conservative investors. As the proportion of wishful-thinking investors increases, the platform lowers the interest rate, and the SME orders a larger quantity and borrows more capital. This reduces the SME's likelihood to successfully repay the loan, which alarmingly indicates that the wishful-thinking investors make online P2P lending more risky by influencing the SME's operations decision. A further investigation shows that the wishful-thinking investors increase both the platform's and the SME's expected profits, echoing the rapid growth of online P2P lending in regions with less mature investors. Each investor's expected payoff, however, decreases when there are more wishful-thinking investors.
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