{"title":"创新的失败:第二次纳戈尔诺-卡拉巴赫战争","authors":"Zhirayr Amirkhanyan","doi":"10.55540/0031-1723.3133","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":": The root cause for the defeat of the Armenian forces in the second Nagorno-Karabakh War was flawed military doctrine inherited from the Soviet Union. This article analyzes the major problems faced by Armenia, uncovers the main reasons for unsuccessful innovation, tests empirical findings against some of the most authoritative theories in the field, and outlines current research on the conflict, while substantiating the analysis with established scholarship in the field of military innovation.","PeriodicalId":131540,"journal":{"name":"The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A Failure to Innovate: The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War\",\"authors\":\"Zhirayr Amirkhanyan\",\"doi\":\"10.55540/0031-1723.3133\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\": The root cause for the defeat of the Armenian forces in the second Nagorno-Karabakh War was flawed military doctrine inherited from the Soviet Union. This article analyzes the major problems faced by Armenia, uncovers the main reasons for unsuccessful innovation, tests empirical findings against some of the most authoritative theories in the field, and outlines current research on the conflict, while substantiating the analysis with established scholarship in the field of military innovation.\",\"PeriodicalId\":131540,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters\",\"volume\":\"8 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-03-09\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.55540/0031-1723.3133\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.55540/0031-1723.3133","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
A Failure to Innovate: The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War
: The root cause for the defeat of the Armenian forces in the second Nagorno-Karabakh War was flawed military doctrine inherited from the Soviet Union. This article analyzes the major problems faced by Armenia, uncovers the main reasons for unsuccessful innovation, tests empirical findings against some of the most authoritative theories in the field, and outlines current research on the conflict, while substantiating the analysis with established scholarship in the field of military innovation.
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