克雷格的上帝不能创造一个暂时的宇宙

Philosophia Christi Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI:10.5840/pc202123227

Erik J. Wielenberg

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引用次数: 1

摘要

威廉·莱恩·克雷格(William Lane Craig)的“潜在卡拉姆”宇宙学论证得出结论，宇宙有其开始的原因(“第一原因”)。克雷格提供了一些补充推理，表明第一个原因是上帝——一个永恒地存在于宇宙之外，又暂时地与宇宙同在的上帝。我认为克雷格关于第一原因本质的假设是不可能的。特别是，不可能是上帝永恒地想要创造宇宙，然后宇宙开始存在。

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Craig’s God Cannot Create a Temporal Universe

William Lane Craig’s inuential kalam cosmological argument concludes that the universe has a cause of its beginning (the “first cause”). Craig provides some supplementary reasoning to suggest that the first cause is God—a God that exists timelessly without the universe and temporally with the universe. I argue that Craig’s hypothesis about the nature of the first cause is impossible. In particular, it cannot be the case that God timelessly wills to create the universe and the universe begins to exist.

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来源期刊

Philosophia Christi

CiteScore

0.50

自引率

0.00%

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