你是人类吗?:基于人类验证的网络钓鱼检测对逃避技术的弹性

S. Maroofi, Maciej Korczyński, A. Duda
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引用次数: 18

摘要

网络钓鱼是当今最常见的网络攻击之一。攻击者不断寻找新技术,通过延长网络钓鱼页面的生命周期,使他们的活动更有利可图。为了实现这一目标,他们利用不同的反分析(即逃避)技术来隐藏反网络钓鱼机器人的恶意内容,只向潜在的受害者显示有效载荷。在本文中,我们研究了反钓鱼实体对三种基于人工验证的高级反分析技术的弹性:谷歌重新验证码、警报框和基于会话的逃避。我们设计了一个框架来执行我们的测试实验,部署了105个钓鱼网站,并为每个网站提供了三种逃避技术中的一种。在实验中,我们向主要的服务器端反网络钓鱼实体(例如,Google Safe Browsing, NetCraft, APWG)报告网络钓鱼url,并监控其在黑名单中的出现情况。我们的结果显示,谷歌安全浏览是唯一的引擎,检测到所有报告的url保护的警告框。然而,没有任何反网络钓鱼引擎能够检测到带有谷歌重新验证码的网络钓鱼网址,这使得它成为迄今为止恶意行为者可用的最有效的网络钓鱼内容保护解决方案。我们的实验表明,所有主要的服务器端反网络钓鱼机器人只检测到105个受人工验证系统保护的网络钓鱼网站中的8个。作为一项缓解计划,我们打算在钓鱼者大规模利用人工验证技术之前,向受影响的反钓鱼实体披露我们的发现。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Are You Human?: Resilience of Phishing Detection to Evasion Techniques Based on Human Verification
Phishing is one of the most common cyberattacks these days. Attackers constantly look for new techniques to make their campaigns more lucrative by extending the lifespan of phishing pages. To achieve this goal, they leverage different anti-analysis (i.e., evasion) techniques to conceal the malicious content from anti-phishing bots and only reveal the payload to potential victims. In this paper, we study the resilience of anti-phishing entities to three advanced anti-analysis techniques based on human verification: Google re-CAPTCHA, alert box, and session-based evasion. We have designed a framework for performing our testing experiments, deployed 105 phishing websites, and provided each of them with one of the three evasion techniques. In the experiments, we report phishing URLs to major server-side anti-phishing entities (e.g., Google Safe Browsing, NetCraft, APWG) and monitor their occurrence in the blacklists. Our results show that Google Safe Browsing was the only engine that detected all the reported URLs protected by alert boxes. However, none of the anti-phishing engines could detect phishing URLs armed with Google re-CAPTCHA, making it so far the most effective protection solution of phishing content available to malicious actors. Our experiments show that all the major serverside anti-phishing bots only detected 8 out of 105 phishing websites protected by human verification systems. As a mitigation plan, we intend to disclose our findings to the impacted anti-phishing entities before phishers exploit human verification techniques on a massive scale.
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