资产流动性持续的贱卖、LOLR和银行挤兑

U. Bindseil, Edoardo Lanari
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引用次数: 2

摘要

银行的资产贱卖和对央行信贷的追索权是用持续的资产流动性来建模的,从而可以推导出银行的负债结构。资产出售流动性和央行抵押品框架都在单位区间内被建模为幂函数。资金稳定性被描述为储户之间纯策略的战略银行挤兑博弈。贱卖流动性和央行抵押品框架共同决定了银行体系在不危及金融稳定的情况下实现到期转换的能力。该模型还解释了为什么银行倾向于在央行使用流动性最低的合格抵押品,以及为什么资产流动性突然意外减少或抵押品框架收紧会引发银行挤兑。该模型还表明,除了保护央行的目的之外,抵押品框架还可以被理解为金融稳定和非常规货币政策工具。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Fire Sales, the LOLR and Bank Runs With Continuous Asset Liquidity
Bank's asset fire sales and recourse to central bank credit are modelled with continuous asset liquidity, allowing to derive the liability structure of a bank. Both asset sales liquidity and the central bank collateral framework are modeled as power functions within the unit interval. Funding stability is captured as a strategic bank run game in pure strategies between depositors. Fire sale liquidity and the central bank collateral framework determine jointly the ability of the banking system to deliver maturity transformation without endangering financial stability. The model also explains why banks tend to use the least liquid eligible collateral with the central bank and why a sudden non-anticipated reduction of asset liquidity, or a tightening of the collateral framework, can trigger a bank run. The model also shows that the collateral framework can be understood, beyond its aim to protect the central bank, as financial stability and non-conventional monetary policy instrument.
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