{"title":"贝克莱论上帝","authors":"S. Daniel","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780192893895.003.0015","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Berkeley’s use of a posteriori arguments supports a view of God that is accessible and persuasive for finite minds. However, those arguments ultimately support belief only in a God who is finite. This chapter shows how, by appealing to an a priori argument for God’s existence, Berkeley emphasizes God’s infinity. This does not undermine other arguments, for it does not aim to challenge how those arguments support belief in a God who accounts for all we experience. It only indicates that another kind of argument is needed to show how our knowledge of the existence of an infinite God does not depend a posteriori on our experience of things in the world.","PeriodicalId":268491,"journal":{"name":"George Berkeley and Early Modern Philosophy","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Berkeley on God\",\"authors\":\"S. Daniel\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/OSO/9780192893895.003.0015\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Berkeley’s use of a posteriori arguments supports a view of God that is accessible and persuasive for finite minds. However, those arguments ultimately support belief only in a God who is finite. This chapter shows how, by appealing to an a priori argument for God’s existence, Berkeley emphasizes God’s infinity. This does not undermine other arguments, for it does not aim to challenge how those arguments support belief in a God who accounts for all we experience. It only indicates that another kind of argument is needed to show how our knowledge of the existence of an infinite God does not depend a posteriori on our experience of things in the world.\",\"PeriodicalId\":268491,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"George Berkeley and Early Modern Philosophy\",\"volume\":\"23 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-03-23\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"George Berkeley and Early Modern Philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780192893895.003.0015\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"George Berkeley and Early Modern Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780192893895.003.0015","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Berkeley’s use of a posteriori arguments supports a view of God that is accessible and persuasive for finite minds. However, those arguments ultimately support belief only in a God who is finite. This chapter shows how, by appealing to an a priori argument for God’s existence, Berkeley emphasizes God’s infinity. This does not undermine other arguments, for it does not aim to challenge how those arguments support belief in a God who accounts for all we experience. It only indicates that another kind of argument is needed to show how our knowledge of the existence of an infinite God does not depend a posteriori on our experience of things in the world.