车载网络中保护隐私的公钥基础设施

Pavlo Gaiduk, K. Ranjan, T. Basmer, Florian Tschorsch
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引用次数: 1

摘要

合作性智能运输系统有望大大改善道路安全和运输基础设施的利用。然而,目前的方法建立在保护隐私的政策之上,这引起了严重的担忧。在本文中,我们提出了一种用于车辆到一切通信的隐私保护公钥基础设施(PKI)。我们使用零知识证明进行身份验证,同时仍然能够隐藏身份。为了排除恶意行为者,我们集成了一个基于匿名声誉的黑名单方案。我们在具有资源受限硬件的板载连接单元上的基准测试证实了该方法的可行性。具体来说,我们期望每天大约67 kB的有效负载和35分钟的计算时间来进行身份验证。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Privacy-Preserving Public Key Infrastructure for Vehicular Networks
Cooperative intelligent transport systems promise considerable improvements on road safety and the utilization of transport infrastructures. Current approaches, however, build upon policies to protect privacy, which raise serious concerns. In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving public key infrastructure (PKI) for vehicle-to-everything communication. We use zero-knowledge proofs to authenticate, while still being able to hide identities. In order to exclude malicious actors, we integrate an anonymous reputation-based blacklisting scheme. Our benchmarks on an on-board connectivity unit with resource-constrained hardware confirms the feasibility of the approach. Specifically, we expect approximately 67 kB payload and 35 minutes computation time per day to authenticate.
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