盈余管理的激励对比:西班牙公司董事会活动与董事会薪酬

ERN: Board Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-12-01 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.3710966

Paolo Saona, Laura Muro, Ryan McWay, Mauricio Jara-Bertin

{"title":"盈余管理的激励对比:西班牙公司董事会活动与董事会薪酬","authors":"Paolo Saona, Laura Muro, Ryan McWay, Mauricio Jara-Bertin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3710966","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We analyze the effect board activity and board remuneration has on earnings management (EM). Our results show that more active boards are inefficient in preventing earnings manipulation. Regarding board compensation we find a U-shaped relation indicating that excessive remuneration will lead to more earnings management. Policy recommendations are derived from the findings.","PeriodicalId":170679,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Board Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Contrasting Incentives for Earnings Management: Board Activity and Board Remuneration in Spanish Firms\",\"authors\":\"Paolo Saona, Laura Muro, Ryan McWay, Mauricio Jara-Bertin\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3710966\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We analyze the effect board activity and board remuneration has on earnings management (EM). Our results show that more active boards are inefficient in preventing earnings manipulation. Regarding board compensation we find a U-shaped relation indicating that excessive remuneration will lead to more earnings management. Policy recommendations are derived from the findings.\",\"PeriodicalId\":170679,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERN: Board Motivation & Incentives (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"23 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERN: Board Motivation & Incentives (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3710966\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Board Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3710966","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

摘要

本文分析了董事会活动和董事会薪酬对盈余管理的影响。我们的研究结果表明，更积极的董事会在防止盈余操纵方面效率低下。在董事会薪酬方面，我们发现u型关系表明过高的薪酬会导致更多的盈余管理。政策建议来自调查结果。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

Contrasting Incentives for Earnings Management: Board Activity and Board Remuneration in Spanish Firms

We analyze the effect board activity and board remuneration has on earnings management (EM). Our results show that more active boards are inefficient in preventing earnings manipulation. Regarding board compensation we find a U-shaped relation indicating that excessive remuneration will lead to more earnings management. Policy recommendations are derived from the findings.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

ERN: Board Motivation & Incentives (Topic)

自引率

0.00%

发文量