凯恩斯在《概率论》(1921)中没有“隐藏的方法”:凯恩斯的方法是一种建立在不精确测量和近似上的显式归纳逻辑,它公开地建立在布尔利用区间值概率的非线性、非加性方法的基础上

M. E. Brady
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引用次数: 0

摘要

凯恩斯的方法在《概率论》的第二、三、五部分中有明确的介绍和使用。凯恩斯的方法是建立在乔治·布尔的数学逻辑和代数基础上的归纳逻辑。布尔在他的方法中引入了非线性和不可加性,使用了区间值概率的下界和上界。布尔的方法和凯恩斯的方法一样,明确地处理了不可比较性、不可测量性和不可通约性等问题,这些问题无法用加法和线性概率表示来解决。凯恩斯最初在《概率论》第三章和《通论》第四章对这些问题作了简要的讨论。凯恩斯在《概率论》第15章中称这种方法为不精确的测量和近似。凯恩斯不可能是反数学、反形式主义、反逻辑学家或理性主义者,因为他在布尔的基础上创造了归纳逻辑。根据定义,理性主义者不接受归纳法的概念,这就是为什么他们被称为演绎主义者而不是归纳法主义者。当然,凯恩斯采用了理性主义观点的某些元素,并将这些元素(先验思维、直觉等)与经验主义的某些元素结合起来,创造了早期版本的逻辑经验主义。同样,凯恩斯也不可能是反逻辑学家、反形式主义者和反数学主义者,因为他在《概率论》的第二部分和第五部分中的工作是逻辑的、形式的和数学的分析,直接建立在乔治·布尔的数学逻辑和代数的基础上。认为凯恩斯是一个理性主义者和/或反逻辑学家、反形式主义者和反数学的观点,是由a .卡拉贝利和R.奥唐奈等经济学家维持的,他们从未阅读或理解《概率论》的第二、三、五部分或G .布尔1854年的《思想法则》的16-21章。凯恩斯不可能成为一个理性主义者,在《概率论》第26章的结尾宣称概率是生活的指南,因为所有的理性主义者都拒绝归纳逻辑。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Keynes Had No ‘Hidden Method’ in the A Treatise on Probability (1921): Keynes's Method Is an Explicit Inductive Logic Built on Inexact Measurement and Approximation, Which Was Openly Based on Boole’s Non Linear, Non Additive Approach Using Interval Values Probability
J M Keynes’s method was explicitly introduced and used in the A Treatise on Probability in Parts II, III and V. Keynes’s method is an inductive logic built on the mathematical logic and algebra of George Boole. Boole introduced non linearity and non additivity into his approach using interval valued probability that used lower and upper bounds. Boole’s approach, like Keynes’s, deals explicitly with problems like non comparability, non measurability and incommensurability that can’t be dealt with by additive and linear probability representations. Keynes initially introduced a brief discussion of these problems in chapter III of the A Treatise on Probability and Chapter 4 of the General Theory.

Keynes called this method inexact measurement and approximation in chapter 15 of the A Treatise on Probability. It is impossible for Keynes to be anti-mathematical,anti-formalist, anti logicist, or a rationalist, given that, building on Boole, he created an inductive logic. Rationalists, by definition, do not accept the concept of induction, which is why they are called deductivists and not inductivists. Keynes, of course, took certain elements of the rationalist perspective and combined these elements (a priori thought, intuition, etc.) with certain elements of empiricism to create an early version of logical empiricism. Similarly, it is impossible for Keynes to have been anti logicist, anti formalist and anti mathematical because his work in Parts II and V of the A Treatise on Probability is logical,formal,and mathematical analysis built directly on the mathematical logic and algebra of George Boole.

The belief that Keynes was a rationalist and/or anti logicist, anti formalist and anti mathematical is maintained by economists, such as A. Carabelli and R. O’Donnell, who never read or understood Parts II, III and V of the A Treatise on Probability or chapters 16-21 of G Boole’s 1854 The Laws of Thought. It is impossible for Keynes to be a rationalist and proclaim at the end of chapter 26 of the A Treatise on Probability that probability is the guide to life since all rationalists reject inductive logic.
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