论责任与对事实的无知

J. Dancy
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文是对普里查德的一篇论文的考察,这篇论文将罗斯从外部主义转变为内部主义。外在主义认为,行为人的义务是建立在他们所处情境的特征基础之上的。内在主义认为,行为人的义务不是建立在事物的实际情况上,而是建立在行为人相信事物的情况上。我的结论是,普里查德的论点并不像罗斯想的那么有力;罗斯要是坚持原来的立场会做得更好。论文还考虑了普里查德论文的一个特殊附言的相关性,直到他死后才印刷;这表明附言并没有改善情况。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Prichard on Duty and Ignorance of Fact
This paper is an examination of a paper by Prichard, which converted Ross from externalism to internalism. Externalism is the view that agents’ obligations are grounded in features of the situation that they are in. Internalism is the view that agents’ obligations are grounded not in how things actually are, but in how the agent believes them to be. I conclude that Prichard’s arguments are not as powerful as Ross thought; Ross would have done better to stick to his original position. The paper also considers the relevance of a peculiar postscript to Prichard’s paper which was not printed until after his death; it suggests that the postscript does not improve things.
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