以企业诚信为代价的行政行为中饱私囊的判定

B. Williams, C. Graham
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引用次数: 0

摘要

新冠肺炎疫情及其对美国经济的影响,导致美国在随后的经济衰退初期获得了前所未有的救助。公司排队申请分享资金,但在我们看来,由于自由现金流用于股票回购的风险很大,限制了它们适应经济低迷的能力,因此许多公司不值得获得援助。我们的研究产生了“自我致富的执行行动”(EASE)评分,这是一个季度性的指标,衡量那些致力于长期业务成果的公司,以及那些致力于空心化业务以追求短期市场收益的公司。得分是通过定价、关键财务和高管股票销售/购买(通过SEC表格4数据)的组合来确定的。我们认为,EASE能够准确识别债务的过度杠杆化,以便在高管以人为哄抬的价格抛售股票时回购公司股票。相反,这一数据也表明,对于那些专注于长期发展的前十分之一企业来说,回报效应非常大。展望未来,我们预计EASE将提供一个清晰的窗口,让人们了解公司是如何以一种可立即采取行动的方式运营的,并为公众提供通过投资决策等方式追究公司责任的手段。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Determination of Executive Actions for Self-Enrichment (EASE) at the Cost of Corporate Integrity
The COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on the US economy led to an unprecedented bailout in the early days of the subsequent recession. Companies lined up for a share of the funds, but many of them were in our estimation unworthy of assistance given risky use of free cashflow for share repurchases, limiting their ability to adjust to an economic downturn. Our research resulted in the creation of the Executive Actions for Self-Enrichment (EASE) score, a quarterly determination of the companies that are working toward long-term business outcomes vis a vis those working towards hollowing out their business in the pursuit of short-term market gains. Scores were determined through the combination of pricing, key financials, and executive stock sales/purchases via SEC Form 4 data. We believe that EASE is able to accurately identify the overleveraging of debt to buy back company shares while executives offload their equity at artificially-induced prices. Conversely, this data also indicates an outsized return effect for the top decile of long-term-focused businesses. Going forward, we expect that EASE will provide a clear window into how companies are being run in a way that is immediately actionable, providing the public with the means to hold companies accountable via their investment decisions and beyond.
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