{"title":"竞争拍卖","authors":"D. Fudenberg, Glenn Ellison","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.323740","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the conditions under which two competing and otherwise identical markets or auction sites of different sizes can coexist in equilibrium, without the larger one attracting all of the smaller one's patrons. We find that the range of equilibrium market sizes depends on the aggregate buyer-seller ratio, and also whether the markets are especially \"thin.\"","PeriodicalId":221813,"journal":{"name":"Harvard Economics Department Working Paper Series","volume":"245 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2002-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"141","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Competing Auctions\",\"authors\":\"D. Fudenberg, Glenn Ellison\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.323740\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper studies the conditions under which two competing and otherwise identical markets or auction sites of different sizes can coexist in equilibrium, without the larger one attracting all of the smaller one's patrons. We find that the range of equilibrium market sizes depends on the aggregate buyer-seller ratio, and also whether the markets are especially \\\"thin.\\\"\",\"PeriodicalId\":221813,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Harvard Economics Department Working Paper Series\",\"volume\":\"245 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2002-02-07\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"141\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Harvard Economics Department Working Paper Series\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.323740\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Harvard Economics Department Working Paper Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.323740","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies the conditions under which two competing and otherwise identical markets or auction sites of different sizes can coexist in equilibrium, without the larger one attracting all of the smaller one's patrons. We find that the range of equilibrium market sizes depends on the aggregate buyer-seller ratio, and also whether the markets are especially "thin."
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