{"title":"目标激励,广泛影响:来自电子商务平台的证据","authors":"Xiang Hui, Meng Liu, T. Chan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3709380","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Digital platforms sometimes offer incentives to a subset of sellers to nudge behaviors, but how do these targeted incentives affect all sellers? In this paper, we study a policy change on a large e-commerce platform that offers financial incentives only to platform-certified sellers when they provide fast handling and generous return policies on their listings. We find that both the targeted and non-targeted sellers become more likely to adopt the promoted behavior after the policy change. Exploiting a large number of markets on the platform, we find that in markets with a larger proportion of the targeted population---hence more affected by the policy change---non-targeted sellers are more likely to adopt the promoted behavior and experience a larger increase in sales with little price changes. This finding is consistent with our key insight that a targeted incentive may increase demand for non-targeted sellers if both the targeted type and the promoted behavior are observed and valued by consumers. Our results have managerial implications for digital platforms that use targeted incentives.","PeriodicalId":430354,"journal":{"name":"IO: Empirical Studies of Firms & Markets eJournal","volume":"111 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Targeted Incentives, Broad Impacts: Evidence from an E-commerce Platform\",\"authors\":\"Xiang Hui, Meng Liu, T. Chan\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3709380\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Digital platforms sometimes offer incentives to a subset of sellers to nudge behaviors, but how do these targeted incentives affect all sellers? In this paper, we study a policy change on a large e-commerce platform that offers financial incentives only to platform-certified sellers when they provide fast handling and generous return policies on their listings. We find that both the targeted and non-targeted sellers become more likely to adopt the promoted behavior after the policy change. Exploiting a large number of markets on the platform, we find that in markets with a larger proportion of the targeted population---hence more affected by the policy change---non-targeted sellers are more likely to adopt the promoted behavior and experience a larger increase in sales with little price changes. This finding is consistent with our key insight that a targeted incentive may increase demand for non-targeted sellers if both the targeted type and the promoted behavior are observed and valued by consumers. Our results have managerial implications for digital platforms that use targeted incentives.\",\"PeriodicalId\":430354,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"IO: Empirical Studies of Firms & Markets eJournal\",\"volume\":\"111 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-10-11\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"IO: Empirical Studies of Firms & Markets eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3709380\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IO: Empirical Studies of Firms & Markets eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3709380","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Targeted Incentives, Broad Impacts: Evidence from an E-commerce Platform
Digital platforms sometimes offer incentives to a subset of sellers to nudge behaviors, but how do these targeted incentives affect all sellers? In this paper, we study a policy change on a large e-commerce platform that offers financial incentives only to platform-certified sellers when they provide fast handling and generous return policies on their listings. We find that both the targeted and non-targeted sellers become more likely to adopt the promoted behavior after the policy change. Exploiting a large number of markets on the platform, we find that in markets with a larger proportion of the targeted population---hence more affected by the policy change---non-targeted sellers are more likely to adopt the promoted behavior and experience a larger increase in sales with little price changes. This finding is consistent with our key insight that a targeted incentive may increase demand for non-targeted sellers if both the targeted type and the promoted behavior are observed and valued by consumers. Our results have managerial implications for digital platforms that use targeted incentives.