{"title":"揭示价格上限管制下监管者的(隐性)社会福利权重","authors":"Edilio Valentini","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.856104","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides a simple procedure that can be used in empirical works aimed at uncovering the preferences of regulators over consumers. The inverting procedure proposed by Ross (1984) for the case of a fully informed regulator is adapted to a regulatory situation characterised by price cap regulation.","PeriodicalId":341363,"journal":{"name":"Administrative Law eJournal","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2005-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"6","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Uncovering Regulator's (Implicit) Social Welfare Weights Under Price Cap Regulation\",\"authors\":\"Edilio Valentini\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.856104\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper provides a simple procedure that can be used in empirical works aimed at uncovering the preferences of regulators over consumers. The inverting procedure proposed by Ross (1984) for the case of a fully informed regulator is adapted to a regulatory situation characterised by price cap regulation.\",\"PeriodicalId\":341363,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Administrative Law eJournal\",\"volume\":\"18 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2005-11-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"6\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Administrative Law eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.856104\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Administrative Law eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.856104","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Uncovering Regulator's (Implicit) Social Welfare Weights Under Price Cap Regulation
This paper provides a simple procedure that can be used in empirical works aimed at uncovering the preferences of regulators over consumers. The inverting procedure proposed by Ross (1984) for the case of a fully informed regulator is adapted to a regulatory situation characterised by price cap regulation.