Android智能手机活动劫持攻击的实时检测和反应(短论文)

Anis Bkakria, M. Graa, N. Cuppens-Boulahia, F. Cuppens, Jean-Louis Lanet
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引用次数: 2

摘要

大多数Android用户需要与应用程序交流敏感数据(密码、用户名、安全码和信用卡号)。黑客可以发起网络钓鱼攻击,危及用户数据的机密性。他/她在适当的时机偷偷地将劫持活动注入前景,以获取私人信息。在本文中,我们提出了一种有效的方法,该方法利用已启动活动之间的相似性,以便在运行时检测和响应劫持攻击。我们通过量化系统可能产生的误报数量来证明我们的解决方案的有效性。我们观察到,在最坏的情况下,我们的解决方案产生4.2%的误报,并且在cpu绑定的微基准测试中只产生0.39%的性能开销。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Real-Time Detection and Reaction to Activity Hijacking Attacks in Android Smartphones (Short Paper)
Most Android users are required to communicate sensitive data (passwords, usernames, security codes, and credit card numbers) with applications. Hacker can launch phishing attacks to compromise user data confidentiality. He/She stealthily injects into the foreground a hijacking Activity at the right timing to acquire private information. In this paper, we propose an effective approach that uses the similarity between launched Activities in order to detect and reacts to hijacking attacks during runtime time. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our solution by quantifying the number of false positives that can be generated by our system. We observe that, in the worst case, our solution generates 4.2% of false positives and incurs only 0.39% performance overhead on a CPU-bound micro-benchmark.
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