国际组织作为规范平台:世界银行对伊斯兰开发银行环境贷款的影响

D. Nielson, Christopher O'Keefe
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引用次数: 4

摘要

本文探讨了国际组织(IO)行为的变化可能源于其与其他国际组织的互动这一命题。规范在IOs中的扩散可能是通过规范企业家的社会化来实现的——在早期阶段,这可能依赖于物质激励,也可能发生在规范采纳者模仿规范发起者的过程中。我们还处理非国际组织的规范来源:成员国和非政府组织。我们通过将规范扩散理论应用于国际组织之间的互动来扩展规范扩散理论。我们使用对伊斯兰开发银行(IDB)环境贷款的统计分析来检验从这种方法中得出的假设。伊斯兰开发银行为评估我们的假设提供了一个理想的环境:大多数全球规范的发起者,即发达的工业民主国家,在这家伊斯兰银行的执行董事会中没有投票权。这使我们能够关注国际组织传播的全球规范的影响,工业民主国家是国际组织成员国偏好的影响中最强大的成员,这些成员国共同构成了美洲开发银行的集体本金。我们发现了通过非物质和非授权机制进行IOs社会化的证据。具体而言,国际组织可以通过共同的机构成员资格以及通过规范强大的组织的例子来实现社会化。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
IOs as Norms Platforms: The World Bank’s Influence on Environmental Lending at the Islamic Development Bank
In this paper we explore the proposition that changes in international organization (IO) behavior might derive from the IO’s interactions with other IOs. Norm diffusion across IOs may take place via socialization by the norm entrepreneur—which, in early stages, may rely on material incentives or may occur as the norm adopter emulates the norm initiator. We also address non-IO sources of norms: member states and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). We extend theories of norm diffusion by applying them to interactions between international organizations. We test the hypotheses that derive from this approach using a statistical analysis of Islamic Development Bank (IDB) environmental lending. The IDB provides an ideal setting to evaluate our hypotheses: the originators of most global norms, the advanced industrial democracies, do not have voting shares on the Islamic bank’s executive board. This allows us to focus on the effects of global norms diffused by IOs where the industrial democracies are the most powerful members from the effects of the preferences of IO’s member states, who jointly form the collective principal of the IDB. We find evidence for socialization to IOs through non-material and non-delegated mechanisms. Specifically, international organizations can be socialized through common institutional memberships as well through example of normatively powerful organizations.
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