{"title":"《总论》中的天意与因果关系","authors":"C. Barnes","doi":"10.1515/9783110685008-008","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":": William of Auvergne ’ s treatment of providence in his De universo (1230s) selectively employed Avicenna, Aristotle, and the category of efficient causality to mark a distinction between divine foreknowledge and providence. William ’ s focus on efficiency and affirmation that natural agents work in the mode of servants follows Neoplatonic impulses to instrumentalize nature and thereby risks eviscerating any meaningful secondary causality. Considerations of providence at Paris in the 1230s and 1240s engage with or react to William, with the Summa Halensis providing an interesting example. The Summa Halensis counters this risk by framing providence within the larger scope of divine knowledge and will, using reinterpreted ver-sions of Aristotelian formal and final causality. The Summists avoid the danger of reducing providence to predictive knowledge or to atemporal awareness of temporal events by stressing the causality of the divine intellect and will. Further, the Summists counter the danger of magnifying the causal efficacy of providence until God remains the sole agent of every effect by framing the causality of the divine intellect and will in terms of formal and final causality. By this approach, the Summa Halensis harmonizes providential causality with the integrity of secondary causality. The Summa Halensis begins its consideration of providence with a clear recognition that the observable world is full of confusion and disorder and with a clear affirmation that everything not well ordered in itself ‘ is nevertheless well-ordered with respect to divine providence, which always orders for the good ’ .¹ That this is so appears beyond doubt for the Summists; how it is so requires careful consideration. How does providence order for the good what is disordered in itself? How does divine providence order the disorder of secondary and contingent causes? To answer these and related questions, the Summa Halensis invokes Aristotle ’ s explanatory categories of efficient, formal, and final causality. Without neglecting efficient causality, the Summists place special emphasis on formal and, to a lesser extent, final causality.²","PeriodicalId":153743,"journal":{"name":"The Summa Halensis","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Providence and Causality in the Summa Halensis\",\"authors\":\"C. Barnes\",\"doi\":\"10.1515/9783110685008-008\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\": William of Auvergne ’ s treatment of providence in his De universo (1230s) selectively employed Avicenna, Aristotle, and the category of efficient causality to mark a distinction between divine foreknowledge and providence. William ’ s focus on efficiency and affirmation that natural agents work in the mode of servants follows Neoplatonic impulses to instrumentalize nature and thereby risks eviscerating any meaningful secondary causality. Considerations of providence at Paris in the 1230s and 1240s engage with or react to William, with the Summa Halensis providing an interesting example. The Summa Halensis counters this risk by framing providence within the larger scope of divine knowledge and will, using reinterpreted ver-sions of Aristotelian formal and final causality. The Summists avoid the danger of reducing providence to predictive knowledge or to atemporal awareness of temporal events by stressing the causality of the divine intellect and will. Further, the Summists counter the danger of magnifying the causal efficacy of providence until God remains the sole agent of every effect by framing the causality of the divine intellect and will in terms of formal and final causality. By this approach, the Summa Halensis harmonizes providential causality with the integrity of secondary causality. The Summa Halensis begins its consideration of providence with a clear recognition that the observable world is full of confusion and disorder and with a clear affirmation that everything not well ordered in itself ‘ is nevertheless well-ordered with respect to divine providence, which always orders for the good ’ .¹ That this is so appears beyond doubt for the Summists; how it is so requires careful consideration. How does providence order for the good what is disordered in itself? How does divine providence order the disorder of secondary and contingent causes? To answer these and related questions, the Summa Halensis invokes Aristotle ’ s explanatory categories of efficient, formal, and final causality. Without neglecting efficient causality, the Summists place special emphasis on formal and, to a lesser extent, final causality.²\",\"PeriodicalId\":153743,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The Summa Halensis\",\"volume\":\"23 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-06-22\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The Summa Halensis\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110685008-008\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Summa Halensis","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110685008-008","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
奥弗涅的威廉在他的《论宇宙》(1230年代)中对天意的处理有选择地使用了阿维森纳、亚里士多德和有效因果关系的范畴来区分神的预知和天意。威廉对效率的关注和自然主体以仆人模式工作的肯定遵循了新柏拉图主义的冲动,将自然工具化,从而冒着去除任何有意义的次要因果关系的风险。1230年代和1240年代,巴黎对天意的思考与威廉有联系或有反应,《总结》提供了一个有趣的例子。《halma Summa Halensis》通过在更大的神圣知识和意志范围内构建天意来应对这种风险,使用亚里士多德形式和最终因果关系的重新解释版本。高峰会通过强调神圣智慧和意志的因果关系,避免了将天意简化为预测性知识或对暂时事件的非世俗意识的危险。此外,首脑会议反对放大天意的因果效应的危险,直到上帝仍然是所有结果的唯一代理,通过将神圣的智力和意志的因果关系框定为形式和最终的因果关系。通过这种方法,《总论》调和了天意因果关系和次要因果关系的完整性。《halma Summa ensis》一开始考察天意,就清楚地认识到,可见的世界充满了混乱和无序,并清楚地肯定,一切秩序不佳的事物,"在神的天意看来,却是秩序良好的,神的天意总是为善而安排的"。这是怎么回事需要仔细考虑。天意如何为善安排本身无序的事物?神圣的天意如何安排次要和偶然原因的混乱?为了回答这些和相关的问题,《总结》援引了亚里士多德关于有效因果关系、形式因果关系和最终因果关系的解释范畴。在没有忽视有效因果关系的情况下,峰会特别强调了形式因果关系,并在较小程度上强调了最终因果关系
: William of Auvergne ’ s treatment of providence in his De universo (1230s) selectively employed Avicenna, Aristotle, and the category of efficient causality to mark a distinction between divine foreknowledge and providence. William ’ s focus on efficiency and affirmation that natural agents work in the mode of servants follows Neoplatonic impulses to instrumentalize nature and thereby risks eviscerating any meaningful secondary causality. Considerations of providence at Paris in the 1230s and 1240s engage with or react to William, with the Summa Halensis providing an interesting example. The Summa Halensis counters this risk by framing providence within the larger scope of divine knowledge and will, using reinterpreted ver-sions of Aristotelian formal and final causality. The Summists avoid the danger of reducing providence to predictive knowledge or to atemporal awareness of temporal events by stressing the causality of the divine intellect and will. Further, the Summists counter the danger of magnifying the causal efficacy of providence until God remains the sole agent of every effect by framing the causality of the divine intellect and will in terms of formal and final causality. By this approach, the Summa Halensis harmonizes providential causality with the integrity of secondary causality. The Summa Halensis begins its consideration of providence with a clear recognition that the observable world is full of confusion and disorder and with a clear affirmation that everything not well ordered in itself ‘ is nevertheless well-ordered with respect to divine providence, which always orders for the good ’ .¹ That this is so appears beyond doubt for the Summists; how it is so requires careful consideration. How does providence order for the good what is disordered in itself? How does divine providence order the disorder of secondary and contingent causes? To answer these and related questions, the Summa Halensis invokes Aristotle ’ s explanatory categories of efficient, formal, and final causality. Without neglecting efficient causality, the Summists place special emphasis on formal and, to a lesser extent, final causality.²