使用公共识别序列检测伪造ic

P. Samarin, Kerstin Lemke-Rust
{"title":"使用公共识别序列检测伪造ic","authors":"P. Samarin, Kerstin Lemke-Rust","doi":"10.1109/HST.2017.7951827","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We present a new method for protecting chips against counterfeits that makes the IC identification more accessible to the end user. Our method requires the original chip manufacturer to frequently publish identification sequences for each IC. These sequences are excerpts from the output of a stream cipher that is embedded in the protected chip and parameterized by a secret unique key. The key initialization is done by a trusted party after manufacturing. For IC verification, the end user measures the side channel leakage of the chip under test. The chip is assessed to be genuine if the end user finds a significant correlation between the observed side channel leakage and several previously published identification sequences.","PeriodicalId":190635,"journal":{"name":"2017 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST)","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2017-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Detection of counterfeit ICs using public identification sequences\",\"authors\":\"P. Samarin, Kerstin Lemke-Rust\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/HST.2017.7951827\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We present a new method for protecting chips against counterfeits that makes the IC identification more accessible to the end user. Our method requires the original chip manufacturer to frequently publish identification sequences for each IC. These sequences are excerpts from the output of a stream cipher that is embedded in the protected chip and parameterized by a secret unique key. The key initialization is done by a trusted party after manufacturing. For IC verification, the end user measures the side channel leakage of the chip under test. The chip is assessed to be genuine if the end user finds a significant correlation between the observed side channel leakage and several previously published identification sequences.\",\"PeriodicalId\":190635,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2017 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST)\",\"volume\":\"23 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2017-05-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2017 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/HST.2017.7951827\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2017 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/HST.2017.7951827","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3

摘要

我们提出了一种新的保护芯片防伪的方法,使最终用户更容易获得IC识别。我们的方法要求原始芯片制造商经常发布每个IC的识别序列。这些序列是从嵌入在受保护芯片中的流密码的输出中摘录的,并通过一个秘密的唯一密钥进行参数化。密钥初始化由可信方在制造后完成。对于IC验证,最终用户测量被测芯片的侧通道泄漏。如果最终用户发现观察到的侧信道泄漏与先前发布的几个识别序列之间存在显着相关性,则该芯片被评估为正品。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Detection of counterfeit ICs using public identification sequences
We present a new method for protecting chips against counterfeits that makes the IC identification more accessible to the end user. Our method requires the original chip manufacturer to frequently publish identification sequences for each IC. These sequences are excerpts from the output of a stream cipher that is embedded in the protected chip and parameterized by a secret unique key. The key initialization is done by a trusted party after manufacturing. For IC verification, the end user measures the side channel leakage of the chip under test. The chip is assessed to be genuine if the end user finds a significant correlation between the observed side channel leakage and several previously published identification sequences.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信