保护您的SoC:构建安全的系统芯片设计

S. Bhasin, Trevor E. Carlson, A. Chattopadhyay, Vinay B. Y. Kumar, A. Mendelson, R. Poussier, Yaswanth Tavva
{"title":"保护您的SoC:构建安全的系统芯片设计","authors":"S. Bhasin, Trevor E. Carlson, A. Chattopadhyay, Vinay B. Y. Kumar, A. Mendelson, R. Poussier, Yaswanth Tavva","doi":"10.1109/socc49529.2020.9524760","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Modern System-on-Chip designs (SoCs) are becoming increasingly complex and powerful, catering to a wide range of application domains. Their use in security-critical tasks calls for a holistic approach to SoC design, including security as a first-class architecture constraint, rather than adding security only as an afterthought. The problem is compounded by the inclusion of multiple, potentially untrusted, third party components in the SoC design. To address this challenge systematically, this paper explores four distinct and important aspects of designing secure SoCs. First, starting at the component level, an evaluation framework for assessing component security against physical attacks is proposed. Second, a scalable simulation framework is developed to integrate these secure components which offers flexibility for early- and late-stage SoC development. Third, dynamic and static techniques are proposed to determine when the system is under attack, with a key focus on Hardware Trojans as threat. Finally, a design strategy for integrating untrusted components into a SoC through hardware Root-of-Trust is outlined. For each of these aspects we present early-stage evaluations, and show how these complement each other towards the design of a secure SoC.","PeriodicalId":114740,"journal":{"name":"2020 IEEE 33rd International System-on-Chip Conference (SOCC)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Secure Your SoC: Building System-an-Chip Designs for Security\",\"authors\":\"S. Bhasin, Trevor E. Carlson, A. Chattopadhyay, Vinay B. Y. Kumar, A. Mendelson, R. Poussier, Yaswanth Tavva\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/socc49529.2020.9524760\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Modern System-on-Chip designs (SoCs) are becoming increasingly complex and powerful, catering to a wide range of application domains. Their use in security-critical tasks calls for a holistic approach to SoC design, including security as a first-class architecture constraint, rather than adding security only as an afterthought. The problem is compounded by the inclusion of multiple, potentially untrusted, third party components in the SoC design. To address this challenge systematically, this paper explores four distinct and important aspects of designing secure SoCs. First, starting at the component level, an evaluation framework for assessing component security against physical attacks is proposed. Second, a scalable simulation framework is developed to integrate these secure components which offers flexibility for early- and late-stage SoC development. Third, dynamic and static techniques are proposed to determine when the system is under attack, with a key focus on Hardware Trojans as threat. Finally, a design strategy for integrating untrusted components into a SoC through hardware Root-of-Trust is outlined. For each of these aspects we present early-stage evaluations, and show how these complement each other towards the design of a secure SoC.\",\"PeriodicalId\":114740,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2020 IEEE 33rd International System-on-Chip Conference (SOCC)\",\"volume\":\"5 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-09-08\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2020 IEEE 33rd International System-on-Chip Conference (SOCC)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/socc49529.2020.9524760\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2020 IEEE 33rd International System-on-Chip Conference (SOCC)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/socc49529.2020.9524760","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

现代片上系统设计(soc)正变得越来越复杂和强大,以适应广泛的应用领域。它们在安全关键任务中的使用要求SoC设计的整体方法,包括将安全性作为一级架构约束,而不是仅作为事后考虑添加安全性。在SoC设计中包含多个可能不受信任的第三方组件,使问题更加复杂。为了系统地解决这一挑战,本文探讨了设计安全soc的四个不同且重要的方面。首先,从组件层面出发,提出了一个评估组件抗物理攻击安全性的评估框架。其次,开发了一个可扩展的仿真框架来集成这些安全组件,为早期和后期SoC开发提供灵活性。第三,提出了动态和静态技术来确定系统何时受到攻击,重点关注硬件木马的威胁。最后,概述了通过硬件信任根将不可信组件集成到SoC中的设计策略。对于这些方面,我们都提出了早期评估,并展示了这些方面如何相互补充,以实现安全SoC的设计。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Secure Your SoC: Building System-an-Chip Designs for Security
Modern System-on-Chip designs (SoCs) are becoming increasingly complex and powerful, catering to a wide range of application domains. Their use in security-critical tasks calls for a holistic approach to SoC design, including security as a first-class architecture constraint, rather than adding security only as an afterthought. The problem is compounded by the inclusion of multiple, potentially untrusted, third party components in the SoC design. To address this challenge systematically, this paper explores four distinct and important aspects of designing secure SoCs. First, starting at the component level, an evaluation framework for assessing component security against physical attacks is proposed. Second, a scalable simulation framework is developed to integrate these secure components which offers flexibility for early- and late-stage SoC development. Third, dynamic and static techniques are proposed to determine when the system is under attack, with a key focus on Hardware Trojans as threat. Finally, a design strategy for integrating untrusted components into a SoC through hardware Root-of-Trust is outlined. For each of these aspects we present early-stage evaluations, and show how these complement each other towards the design of a secure SoC.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信