在我朋友的一点帮助下:构建实用的匿名证书

L. Hanzlik, Daniel Slamanig
{"title":"在我朋友的一点帮助下:构建实用的匿名证书","authors":"L. Hanzlik, Daniel Slamanig","doi":"10.1145/3460120.3484582","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Anonymous credentials (ACs) are a powerful cryptographic tool for the secure use of digital services, when simultaneously aiming for strong privacy guarantees of users combined with strong authentication guarantees for providers of services. They allow users to selectively prove possession of attributes encoded in a credential without revealing any other meaningful information about themselves. While there is a significant body of research on AC systems, modern use-cases of ACs such as mobile applications come with various requirements not sufficiently considered so far. These include preventing the sharing of credentials and coping with resource constraints of the platforms (e.g., smart cards such as SIM cards in smartphones). Such aspects are typically out of scope of AC constructions, and, thus AC systems that can be considered entirely practical have been elusive so far. In this paper we address this problem by introducing and formalizing the notion of core/helper anonymous credentials (CHAC). The model considers a constrained core device (e.g., a SIM card) and a powerful helper device (e.g., a smartphone). The key idea is that the core device performs operations that do not depend on the size of the credential or the number of attributes, but at the same time the helper device is unable to use the credential without its help. We present a provably secure generic construction of CHACs using a combination of signatures with flexible public keys (SFPK) and the novel notion of aggregatable attribute-based equivalence class signatures (AAEQ) along with a concrete instantiation. The key characteristics of our scheme are that the size of showing tokens is independent of the number of attributes in the credential(s) and that the core device only needs to compute a single elliptic curve scalar multiplication, regardless of the number of attributes. We confirm the practical efficiency of our CHACs with an implementation of our scheme on a Multos smart card as the core and an Android smartphone as the helper device. A credential showing requires less than 500 ms on the smart card and around 200 ms on the smartphone (even for a credential with 1000 attributes).","PeriodicalId":135883,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"22","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"With a Little Help from My Friends: Constructing Practical Anonymous Credentials\",\"authors\":\"L. Hanzlik, Daniel Slamanig\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/3460120.3484582\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Anonymous credentials (ACs) are a powerful cryptographic tool for the secure use of digital services, when simultaneously aiming for strong privacy guarantees of users combined with strong authentication guarantees for providers of services. They allow users to selectively prove possession of attributes encoded in a credential without revealing any other meaningful information about themselves. While there is a significant body of research on AC systems, modern use-cases of ACs such as mobile applications come with various requirements not sufficiently considered so far. These include preventing the sharing of credentials and coping with resource constraints of the platforms (e.g., smart cards such as SIM cards in smartphones). Such aspects are typically out of scope of AC constructions, and, thus AC systems that can be considered entirely practical have been elusive so far. In this paper we address this problem by introducing and formalizing the notion of core/helper anonymous credentials (CHAC). The model considers a constrained core device (e.g., a SIM card) and a powerful helper device (e.g., a smartphone). The key idea is that the core device performs operations that do not depend on the size of the credential or the number of attributes, but at the same time the helper device is unable to use the credential without its help. We present a provably secure generic construction of CHACs using a combination of signatures with flexible public keys (SFPK) and the novel notion of aggregatable attribute-based equivalence class signatures (AAEQ) along with a concrete instantiation. The key characteristics of our scheme are that the size of showing tokens is independent of the number of attributes in the credential(s) and that the core device only needs to compute a single elliptic curve scalar multiplication, regardless of the number of attributes. We confirm the practical efficiency of our CHACs with an implementation of our scheme on a Multos smart card as the core and an Android smartphone as the helper device. A credential showing requires less than 500 ms on the smart card and around 200 ms on the smartphone (even for a credential with 1000 attributes).\",\"PeriodicalId\":135883,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security\",\"volume\":\"42 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-11-12\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"22\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/3460120.3484582\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3460120.3484582","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 22

摘要

匿名凭证(ACs)是一种强大的加密工具,用于安全使用数字服务,同时旨在为用户提供强大的隐私保证,并为服务提供者提供强大的身份验证保证。它们允许用户有选择地证明凭证中编码的属性的所有权,而不会泄露关于自己的任何其他有意义的信息。虽然对交流系统进行了大量的研究,但现代交流用例(如移动应用程序)带来的各种需求到目前为止还没有得到充分的考虑。这些包括防止凭证共享和应对平台的资源限制(例如,智能手机中的SIM卡等智能卡)。这些方面通常超出了交流结构的范围,因此,迄今为止,可以被认为完全实用的交流系统一直是难以捉摸的。在本文中,我们通过引入和形式化核心/助手匿名凭证(CHAC)的概念来解决这个问题。该模型考虑了一个受限的核心设备(如SIM卡)和一个强大的辅助设备(如智能手机)。关键思想是,核心设备执行的操作不依赖于凭证的大小或属性的数量,但与此同时,helper设备在没有它的帮助的情况下无法使用凭证。我们使用灵活公钥签名(SFPK)和基于属性的可聚合等价类签名(AAEQ)的新概念组合提出了一个可证明安全的CHACs通用构造,并给出了一个具体实例。我们方案的关键特征是,显示令牌的大小与凭证中的属性数量无关,并且无论属性的数量如何,核心设备只需要计算单个椭圆曲线标量乘法。我们以Multos智能卡为核心,以Android智能手机为辅助设备,验证了CHACs的实际效率。在智能卡上显示凭证需要不到500毫秒,在智能手机上需要大约200毫秒(即使是具有1000个属性的凭证)。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
With a Little Help from My Friends: Constructing Practical Anonymous Credentials
Anonymous credentials (ACs) are a powerful cryptographic tool for the secure use of digital services, when simultaneously aiming for strong privacy guarantees of users combined with strong authentication guarantees for providers of services. They allow users to selectively prove possession of attributes encoded in a credential without revealing any other meaningful information about themselves. While there is a significant body of research on AC systems, modern use-cases of ACs such as mobile applications come with various requirements not sufficiently considered so far. These include preventing the sharing of credentials and coping with resource constraints of the platforms (e.g., smart cards such as SIM cards in smartphones). Such aspects are typically out of scope of AC constructions, and, thus AC systems that can be considered entirely practical have been elusive so far. In this paper we address this problem by introducing and formalizing the notion of core/helper anonymous credentials (CHAC). The model considers a constrained core device (e.g., a SIM card) and a powerful helper device (e.g., a smartphone). The key idea is that the core device performs operations that do not depend on the size of the credential or the number of attributes, but at the same time the helper device is unable to use the credential without its help. We present a provably secure generic construction of CHACs using a combination of signatures with flexible public keys (SFPK) and the novel notion of aggregatable attribute-based equivalence class signatures (AAEQ) along with a concrete instantiation. The key characteristics of our scheme are that the size of showing tokens is independent of the number of attributes in the credential(s) and that the core device only needs to compute a single elliptic curve scalar multiplication, regardless of the number of attributes. We confirm the practical efficiency of our CHACs with an implementation of our scheme on a Multos smart card as the core and an Android smartphone as the helper device. A credential showing requires less than 500 ms on the smart card and around 200 ms on the smartphone (even for a credential with 1000 attributes).
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信