基于满足形式游戏的无线网络资源管理再设计

Panagiotis Promponas, P. Apostolopoulos, Eirini-Eleni Tsiropoulou, S. Papavassiliou
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引用次数: 6

摘要

智能手机的普及,以及对具有不同服务质量(QoS)要求的个性化服务的需求,使人们对无线网络中的节能资源管理框架产生了越来越大的兴趣,在无线网络中,用户的行动和决策是相互依存的。本文重点研究了满足形式下博弈论视角下的上行功率控制问题的转化与处理。引入了最小有效满足均衡的新概念,并对其性质进行了研究。考虑到每个用户的行为都与一个代价函数相关联,所以在MESE点定义每个用户以最低代价满足其QoS先决条件的传输功率。我们证明了在ESE点,系统达到了最低的累积成本,而每个用户单独被惩罚的成本与任何有效满足均衡(ESE)点的相应成本相比都是最小的。研究了最优响应方程的存在性、唯一性和优点,提出了一种收敛于最优响应方程的分布式低复杂度算法。通过建模和仿真,对所提出的新型资源管理框架的性能进行了评价,并揭示了其优点。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Redesigning Resource Management in Wireless Networks based on Games in Satisfaction Form
The rise in popularity of smartphones, along with the need for personalized services with different Quality of Service (QoS) requirements, has created an increased interest for energy-efficient resource management frameworks in wireless networks, where user actions and decisions are interdependent. Our focus is placed on the transformation and treatment of the uplink power control problem under the perspective of game theory in satisfaction form. The novel concept of Minimum Efficient Satisfaction Equilibrium (MESE) is introduced and its properties are investigated. Considering that each user is associated with a cost function with respect to its actions, the MESE point defines each user’s transmission power that satisfies its QoS prerequisites with the lowest cost. We prove that at the MESE point the system achieves the lowest possible cumulative cost, while each user individually is penalized with the minimum cost compared to the corresponding cost of any Efficient Satisfaction Equilibrium (ESE) point. The existence, uniqueness and benefits of the MESE are studied, and a distributed low complexity algorithm based on the Best Response Dynamics that converges to the MESE point is proposed. Through modeling and simulation, the performance of the proposed novel resource management framework is evaluated, and its benefits are revealed.
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