基于观察路径性能的manet集中式信誉系统

J. Konorski, K. Rydzewski
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引用次数: 6

摘要

描述了一个用于manet的信誉系统,该系统试图从观察到的端到端路径性能中推断节点的可信度(转发行为)。可信度推断算法产生区间估计,并且在节点错误行为相对于遍历路径不是选择性的情况下工作良好。节点的信誉等级是在慷慨的以牙还牙的精神下计算的,以便最好地反映节点的瞬时可信度。转发传输数据包时,高声誉的源优先(间接互惠),多路径DSR优先使用高声誉的路径。对于简化的网络模型,假设节点能够以高源吞吐量的视角控制其声誉水平,我们发现维持高声誉可能代价高昂。我们研究了一个新兴的声誉博弈及其产生合作激励纳什均衡的条件。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
A Centralized Reputation System for MANETs Based on Observed Path Performance
A reputation system for MANETs is described that attempts to deduce nodal trustworthiness (forwarding behaviour) from observed end-to-end path performance. The trustworthiness deduction algorithm produces interval estimates and works well if node misbehaviour is not selective with respect to traversing paths. Nodal reputation levels are next calculated in the spirit of generous tit-for-tat so as to best reflect momentary nodal trustworthiness. High-reputed sources are favoured when forwarding transit packets (indirect reciprocity) and high-reputed paths are favoured by the multipath DSR. For a simplified network model and assuming the nodes are able to control their reputation levels with a view of a high source throughput, we find that high reputation may be costly to maintain. We examine an arising reputation game and conditions under which it produces a cooperation-stimulating Nash equilibrium.
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