{"title":"宽恕邪恶","authors":"E. Garrard, D. Mcnaughton","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190602147.003.0009","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Are evil acts forgivable? This question lies at the intersection of theories about the nature of evil and theories about the nature of forgiveness. Since evil acts seem to be the most plausible candidates for unforgivability, we start with a brief defense of the secular deployment of the idea of evil, and then move to an overview of various theories of evil. After providing an outline of what forgiveness involves, we consider what being unforgivable might actually amount to. Four possible accounts of being unforgivable are canvassed—psychological impossibility, psychological difficulty, lack of reasons for forgiveness, and a moral prohibition on forgiveness—and their implications for the opening question are considered. We conclude that nothing so far considered rules out the moral permissibility of forgiveness for evil acts. Finally, the question of whether forgiveness would enable the evildoer’s slate to be wiped clean at last is briefly considered.","PeriodicalId":106466,"journal":{"name":"Forgiveness and Its Moral Dimensions","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Forgiving Evil\",\"authors\":\"E. Garrard, D. Mcnaughton\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/oso/9780190602147.003.0009\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Are evil acts forgivable? This question lies at the intersection of theories about the nature of evil and theories about the nature of forgiveness. Since evil acts seem to be the most plausible candidates for unforgivability, we start with a brief defense of the secular deployment of the idea of evil, and then move to an overview of various theories of evil. After providing an outline of what forgiveness involves, we consider what being unforgivable might actually amount to. Four possible accounts of being unforgivable are canvassed—psychological impossibility, psychological difficulty, lack of reasons for forgiveness, and a moral prohibition on forgiveness—and their implications for the opening question are considered. We conclude that nothing so far considered rules out the moral permissibility of forgiveness for evil acts. Finally, the question of whether forgiveness would enable the evildoer’s slate to be wiped clean at last is briefly considered.\",\"PeriodicalId\":106466,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Forgiveness and Its Moral Dimensions\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-06-17\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Forgiveness and Its Moral Dimensions\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190602147.003.0009\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Forgiveness and Its Moral Dimensions","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190602147.003.0009","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Are evil acts forgivable? This question lies at the intersection of theories about the nature of evil and theories about the nature of forgiveness. Since evil acts seem to be the most plausible candidates for unforgivability, we start with a brief defense of the secular deployment of the idea of evil, and then move to an overview of various theories of evil. After providing an outline of what forgiveness involves, we consider what being unforgivable might actually amount to. Four possible accounts of being unforgivable are canvassed—psychological impossibility, psychological difficulty, lack of reasons for forgiveness, and a moral prohibition on forgiveness—and their implications for the opening question are considered. We conclude that nothing so far considered rules out the moral permissibility of forgiveness for evil acts. Finally, the question of whether forgiveness would enable the evildoer’s slate to be wiped clean at last is briefly considered.