避免系统风险管理政治经济学中的八警火灾

Jeffrey N. Gordon, Christopher Muller
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引用次数: 5

摘要

金融领域固有的紧张局势意味着,极端压力的发作即使不可预测,也是不可避免的。即使监管和监督制度在许多方面是有效的,情况也是如此。政府干预的能力可能决定危机是局限于金融部门,还是会蔓延到实体经济。尽管足够的决议授权来解决倒闭的金融公司是当前监管改革的必要目标,但逐个公司的方法将无法解决像2007-08年危机这样的重大系统性失败,这可能需要金融部门的资本支持,以避免严重的经济损害。因此,我们建议由财政部、美联储和联邦存款保险公司之间的协议触发备用系统紧急情况发现权。这样一个基金的规模应与美国经济规模(1万亿美元)相匹配,应该通过对所有受益于系统稳定的大型金融公司进行风险调整评估来提供资金(以及部分预先提供资金)。备用紧急权力避免了在危机中采取高风险立法行动的需要,即使成功也会造成不稳定,如果失败则会造成灾难性后果。“三重关键”约束和持续监测和监督应解决合法性和问责制问题。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Avoiding Eight-Alarm Fires in the Political Economy of Systemic Risk Management
The inherent tensions in the financial sector mean that episodes of extreme stress are inevitable, if unpredictable. This is so even if the regulatory and supervisory regimes are in many respects effective. The capacity of government to intervene may determine whether the distress is confined to the financial sector or breaks out into the real economy. Although adequate resolution authority to address a failing financial firm is a necessary objective of the current regulatory reform, a firm-by-firm approach will be unable to address a major systemic failure such as the Crisis of 2007-08, which may require capital support of the financial sector to avoid severe economic harm. We therefore propose standby systemic emergency finding authority, triggered by agreement among Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and the FDIC. Such a fund, scaled appropriately to the size of the US economy, $1 trillion, should be funded (and partially pre-funded) by risk-adjusted assessments on all large financial firms, who benefit from systemic stability. Standby emergency authority avoids the need for high stakes legislative action mid-crisis, which can be destabilizing even if successful and catastrophic if not. The triple key‖ constraint and on-going monitoring and oversight should address concerns of legitimacy and accountability.
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