3 The wider Greco-Roman discourse on being human and the idea of a human role in the cosmos

In this chapter we offer two broader contextualisations for our analysis of Epictetus as a parallel to Romans. The first is a diachronic survey of important texts that reflect on what it means to be human (section 3.1). The result of this will be to show that the human endowment with reason is a prominent part of a wider Greco-Roman discourse on what it means to be human. This is important because it shows that the traditions we see articulated particularly in Epictetus (chapter 4) are more broadly shared. The second contextualisation focuses on the idea of a human role in the cosmos in Greco-Roman sources (section 3.2). This is important because it (a) helps us to define our notion of a human vocation in conversation with ancient texts (and an important study of Heinemann1); and it (b) shows the variety of language that is used to express this. This chapter can be regarded as complementary to our discussion of the definition of human beings as ζῶα λογικά in the previous chapter. Some of the themes which we here encounter as part of our general survey of GrecoRoman reflection on what it means to be human, based mainly on evaluating sources discussed in secondary literature, we have found already in our corpus-based research. This lends support to our claim that broader anthropological reflection is condensated in discourse employing the definition of human beings as rational mortal animals. Most of the passages we discuss in the following contain reason language in a broader sense (for which our list in note 1 of section 1.1 may be consulted), but not yet the term λογικός (though Aristotle uses λόγος). This is because the sources we discuss here are mostly pre-Chrysippean, and as we have shown in section 2.2, the term used in this sense can only reliably be documented since the 3d century BC. But many of the distinctions and ideas, including the contrast with irrational animals (τὰ ἄλογα), are already there. With a view to Rom 12.1–2, we may also point out that since Rom 12.1b refers to the human body (τὰ σώματα) and Rom 12.1c (λογικός) and Rom 12.2b (νοῦς), as we shall argue, to human reason, we will be particularly interested in the discussion of the relation of the human body and mind in the following texts. Furthermore, because Rom 12.1–2 serves an important transitional function in the letter (as we shall argue in chapter 7), and hence is linked to other themes dis-