欧洲反垄断罚款的有效性

ERN: Antitrust (European) (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-11-13 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.3730361

C. Veljanovski

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引用次数: 1

摘要

本文从经济学的角度考察了欧盟委员会对卡特尔实施行政罚款的有效性。它回顾了最佳罚款的理论、实践和证据，并评估了欧盟委员会的罚款、宽大处理和和解程序是否会阻止或影响卡特尔的行为。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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The Effectiveness of European Antitrust Fines

This paper examines the effectiveness of the administrative fines imposed by the European Commission on cartels from an economic perspective. It reviews the theory, practice, and evidence of optimal fines and assesses whether the European Commission fines, leniency, and settlement procedures deter and otherwise affect the actions of cartels.

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ERN: Antitrust (European) (Topic)

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