无证书签名加密方案的密码分析

2019 16th International ISC (Iranian Society of Cryptology) Conference on Information Security and Cryptology (ISCISC) Pub Date : 2019-08-01 DOI:10.1109/ISCISC48546.2019.8985158

Parvin Rastegari, Mohammad Dakhilalian

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引用次数: 1

摘要

2016年，郑和李提出了一种无证书签名加密(CL-SC)方案，并声称他们的方案在标准模型中对密钥替换和恶意KGC攻击具有保密性(IND-CCA)和不可伪造性(EUF-CMA)。在本文中，我们提出了密钥替换和恶意KGC攻击，以反对其方案的保密性和不可伪造性。我们提出的攻击表明，与郑和李的说法相反，他们的方案既不是机密的(IND-CCA)，也不是不可伪造的(EUF-CMA)，以对抗密钥替换和恶意KGC攻击。

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Cryptanalysis of a Certificateless Signcryption Scheme

In 2016, Zheng and Li proposed a certificateless signcryption (CL-SC) scheme and claimed that their scheme is confidential (IND-CCA) and unforgeable (EUF-CMA) against both key replacement and malicious KGC attacks, in the standard model. In this paper, we propose both key replacement and malicious KGC attacks against confidentiality and unforgeability of their scheme. Our proposed attacks show that in contrast to Zheng and Li's claim, their scheme is neither confidential (IND-CCA) nor unforgeable (EUF-CMA) against key replacement and malicious KGC attacks.

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来源期刊

2019 16th International ISC (Iranian Society of Cryptology) Conference on Information Security and Cryptology (ISCISC)

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