可信的承诺:利用各种选择支持伙伴关系

Marian W. Moszoro
{"title":"可信的承诺:利用各种选择支持伙伴关系","authors":"Marian W. Moszoro","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1729652","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Opportunism --- either governmental hold-up by unfair regulation and expropriation, or private monopoly pricing and investment and quality curbing --- is a powerful deterrent from successful-to-be public-private partnerships with large sunk investments and welfare externalities. The agents can overcome this double-sided moral hazard by exchanging an exit (put) option for the investor and a bail-out (call) option for the public agent on the investor's outlay. The exit/bail-out option mechanism increases the set of payoffs by offsetting deviation, and thus facilitates cooperation. The mechanism is applicable to other settings with partially aligned goals and informational asymmetries.","PeriodicalId":395628,"journal":{"name":"IESE Business School Working Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Credible Commitments: Using Options to Support Partnerships\",\"authors\":\"Marian W. Moszoro\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.1729652\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Opportunism --- either governmental hold-up by unfair regulation and expropriation, or private monopoly pricing and investment and quality curbing --- is a powerful deterrent from successful-to-be public-private partnerships with large sunk investments and welfare externalities. The agents can overcome this double-sided moral hazard by exchanging an exit (put) option for the investor and a bail-out (call) option for the public agent on the investor's outlay. The exit/bail-out option mechanism increases the set of payoffs by offsetting deviation, and thus facilitates cooperation. The mechanism is applicable to other settings with partially aligned goals and informational asymmetries.\",\"PeriodicalId\":395628,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"IESE Business School Working Paper Series\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2012-12-30\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"IESE Business School Working Paper Series\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1729652\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IESE Business School Working Paper Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1729652","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

机会主义——要么是政府通过不公平的监管和征用加以阻碍,要么是私人垄断定价、投资和质量控制——是阻碍公私合作伙伴关系成功发展的强大障碍,这种伙伴关系具有大量沉没投资和福利外部性。代理人可以通过交换投资者的退出(看跌)期权和公共代理人对投资者支出的救市(买入)期权来克服这种双面道德风险。退出/救助选择机制通过抵消偏离增加了收益集,从而促进了合作。该机制适用于其他目标部分一致和信息不对称的情况。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Credible Commitments: Using Options to Support Partnerships
Opportunism --- either governmental hold-up by unfair regulation and expropriation, or private monopoly pricing and investment and quality curbing --- is a powerful deterrent from successful-to-be public-private partnerships with large sunk investments and welfare externalities. The agents can overcome this double-sided moral hazard by exchanging an exit (put) option for the investor and a bail-out (call) option for the public agent on the investor's outlay. The exit/bail-out option mechanism increases the set of payoffs by offsetting deviation, and thus facilitates cooperation. The mechanism is applicable to other settings with partially aligned goals and informational asymmetries.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信