{"title":"可信的承诺:利用各种选择支持伙伴关系","authors":"Marian W. Moszoro","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1729652","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Opportunism --- either governmental hold-up by unfair regulation and expropriation, or private monopoly pricing and investment and quality curbing --- is a powerful deterrent from successful-to-be public-private partnerships with large sunk investments and welfare externalities. The agents can overcome this double-sided moral hazard by exchanging an exit (put) option for the investor and a bail-out (call) option for the public agent on the investor's outlay. The exit/bail-out option mechanism increases the set of payoffs by offsetting deviation, and thus facilitates cooperation. The mechanism is applicable to other settings with partially aligned goals and informational asymmetries.","PeriodicalId":395628,"journal":{"name":"IESE Business School Working Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Credible Commitments: Using Options to Support Partnerships\",\"authors\":\"Marian W. Moszoro\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.1729652\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Opportunism --- either governmental hold-up by unfair regulation and expropriation, or private monopoly pricing and investment and quality curbing --- is a powerful deterrent from successful-to-be public-private partnerships with large sunk investments and welfare externalities. The agents can overcome this double-sided moral hazard by exchanging an exit (put) option for the investor and a bail-out (call) option for the public agent on the investor's outlay. The exit/bail-out option mechanism increases the set of payoffs by offsetting deviation, and thus facilitates cooperation. The mechanism is applicable to other settings with partially aligned goals and informational asymmetries.\",\"PeriodicalId\":395628,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"IESE Business School Working Paper Series\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2012-12-30\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"IESE Business School Working Paper Series\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1729652\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IESE Business School Working Paper Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1729652","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Credible Commitments: Using Options to Support Partnerships
Opportunism --- either governmental hold-up by unfair regulation and expropriation, or private monopoly pricing and investment and quality curbing --- is a powerful deterrent from successful-to-be public-private partnerships with large sunk investments and welfare externalities. The agents can overcome this double-sided moral hazard by exchanging an exit (put) option for the investor and a bail-out (call) option for the public agent on the investor's outlay. The exit/bail-out option mechanism increases the set of payoffs by offsetting deviation, and thus facilitates cooperation. The mechanism is applicable to other settings with partially aligned goals and informational asymmetries.