{"title":"情报责任的多样性","authors":"C. Leuprecht","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192893949.003.0008","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter uses a comparative approach to identify findings among accountability systems across the Five Eyes intelligence community. Commonalities and trends of convergence in intelligence accountability are relevant for and beyond the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. These observations show challenges and opportunities in democracies to reconcile the different logics that inform security and rule-of-law systems. It begins by comparing across types of accountability: review, oversight, compliance, and benchmark criteria such as reasonableness, propriety, proportionality, necessity, efficiency, and effectiveness. Specifically, the comparative findings suggest potential for innovation to play a greater role in signalling trends to governments and improving consistency and quality. The chapter then compares types of accountability bodies and commissions. The remainder of the chapter compares attributes of accountability: mandates, appointment processes, and qualifications for membership, reports, powers, access to information, security requirements, and procedural discretion. It closes on the emerging need to coordinate accountability across an intelligence system. Coordination within an accountability system allows accountability bodies to avert duplication, fill accountability gaps, and help inform each other about issues of potential importance. Coordination and de-confliction are essential for maximizing overall efficiency and effectiveness of accountability systems where mandates of multiple bodies may overlap or conflict.","PeriodicalId":200323,"journal":{"name":"Intelligence as Democratic Statecraft","volume":"39 10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Varieties of Intelligence Accountability\",\"authors\":\"C. Leuprecht\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/oso/9780192893949.003.0008\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This chapter uses a comparative approach to identify findings among accountability systems across the Five Eyes intelligence community. Commonalities and trends of convergence in intelligence accountability are relevant for and beyond the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. These observations show challenges and opportunities in democracies to reconcile the different logics that inform security and rule-of-law systems. It begins by comparing across types of accountability: review, oversight, compliance, and benchmark criteria such as reasonableness, propriety, proportionality, necessity, efficiency, and effectiveness. Specifically, the comparative findings suggest potential for innovation to play a greater role in signalling trends to governments and improving consistency and quality. The chapter then compares types of accountability bodies and commissions. The remainder of the chapter compares attributes of accountability: mandates, appointment processes, and qualifications for membership, reports, powers, access to information, security requirements, and procedural discretion. It closes on the emerging need to coordinate accountability across an intelligence system. Coordination within an accountability system allows accountability bodies to avert duplication, fill accountability gaps, and help inform each other about issues of potential importance. Coordination and de-confliction are essential for maximizing overall efficiency and effectiveness of accountability systems where mandates of multiple bodies may overlap or conflict.\",\"PeriodicalId\":200323,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Intelligence as Democratic Statecraft\",\"volume\":\"39 10 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-06-20\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Intelligence as Democratic Statecraft\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192893949.003.0008\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Intelligence as Democratic Statecraft","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192893949.003.0008","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter uses a comparative approach to identify findings among accountability systems across the Five Eyes intelligence community. Commonalities and trends of convergence in intelligence accountability are relevant for and beyond the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. These observations show challenges and opportunities in democracies to reconcile the different logics that inform security and rule-of-law systems. It begins by comparing across types of accountability: review, oversight, compliance, and benchmark criteria such as reasonableness, propriety, proportionality, necessity, efficiency, and effectiveness. Specifically, the comparative findings suggest potential for innovation to play a greater role in signalling trends to governments and improving consistency and quality. The chapter then compares types of accountability bodies and commissions. The remainder of the chapter compares attributes of accountability: mandates, appointment processes, and qualifications for membership, reports, powers, access to information, security requirements, and procedural discretion. It closes on the emerging need to coordinate accountability across an intelligence system. Coordination within an accountability system allows accountability bodies to avert duplication, fill accountability gaps, and help inform each other about issues of potential importance. Coordination and de-confliction are essential for maximizing overall efficiency and effectiveness of accountability systems where mandates of multiple bodies may overlap or conflict.