情报责任的多样性

C. Leuprecht
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本章使用比较方法来确定五眼情报界问责制的调查结果。情报问责制的共性和趋同趋势不仅适用于美国、英国、加拿大、澳大利亚和新西兰,也适用于其他国家。这些观察结果表明,民主国家在协调安全和法治体系的不同逻辑方面面临的挑战和机遇。首先比较不同类型的问责制:审查、监督、遵从和基准标准,如合理性、适当性、比例性、必要性、效率和有效性。具体而言,比较结果表明,创新在向政府传达趋势和提高一致性和质量方面发挥更大作用的潜力。然后,本章比较了问责机构和委员会的类型。本章的其余部分比较了问责制的属性:授权、任命程序、成员资格、报告、权力、信息获取、安全要求和程序自由裁量权。它结束了在整个情报系统中协调问责制的新需要。问责制内的协调使问责机构能够避免重复,填补问责空白,并有助于相互通报潜在的重要问题。在多个机构的任务可能重叠或冲突的情况下,协调和消除冲突对于最大限度地提高问责制的总体效率和效力至关重要。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Varieties of Intelligence Accountability
This chapter uses a comparative approach to identify findings among accountability systems across the Five Eyes intelligence community. Commonalities and trends of convergence in intelligence accountability are relevant for and beyond the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. These observations show challenges and opportunities in democracies to reconcile the different logics that inform security and rule-of-law systems. It begins by comparing across types of accountability: review, oversight, compliance, and benchmark criteria such as reasonableness, propriety, proportionality, necessity, efficiency, and effectiveness. Specifically, the comparative findings suggest potential for innovation to play a greater role in signalling trends to governments and improving consistency and quality. The chapter then compares types of accountability bodies and commissions. The remainder of the chapter compares attributes of accountability: mandates, appointment processes, and qualifications for membership, reports, powers, access to information, security requirements, and procedural discretion. It closes on the emerging need to coordinate accountability across an intelligence system. Coordination within an accountability system allows accountability bodies to avert duplication, fill accountability gaps, and help inform each other about issues of potential importance. Coordination and de-confliction are essential for maximizing overall efficiency and effectiveness of accountability systems where mandates of multiple bodies may overlap or conflict.
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