乐观快速BFT的线性视图变化

M. Rambaud, Andrei Tonkikh, Mark Abspoel
{"title":"乐观快速BFT的线性视图变化","authors":"M. Rambaud, Andrei Tonkikh, Mark Abspoel","doi":"10.1145/3560829.3563562","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"To be competitive with centralized applications, consensus protocols in blockchains must provide minimal latency while being able to scale to thousands of participants in order to preserve a high level of decentralization. A common way to minimize latency is to augment a consensus protocol with a fast track, which ensures that a decision is reached in just a couple of message delays in favorable conditions. However, it is a challenging task to preserve safety and good performance when these favorable conditions do not hold. To the best of our knowledge, all existing Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus protocols with fast tracks require view change protocols with quadratic authenticator complexity. In this paper, we provide the first solution to Byzantine consensus with fast track with a linear view change. The protocol incurs no asymptotic overhead over the baseline while reducing the latency in favorable conditions by a factor of 2. Our construction is based on a novel type of cryptographic proofs, which we call Proofs of Exclusivity (or PoE for short), which may be of independent interest. While our protocol for constructing a PoE comes at no extra costs in latency or asymptotic complexities, it does require some extra computation. To make sure that it does not impair the overall performance, we also show how to apply accountability and proofs of misbehavior in order to reduce to zero the overhead incurred by the computation of a PoE. More precisely, our mechanism guarantees that whenever this overhead is not zero, then automatically honest participants obtain a publicly verifiable proof that a well-identified malicious participant openly misbehaved. In this case, the overhead of computing a few extra threshold signatures for the Proof of Exclusivity can be seen as a relatively small price to get rid of a malicious participant.","PeriodicalId":182280,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2022 ACM Workshop on Developments in Consensus","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Linear View Change in Optimistically Fast BFT\",\"authors\":\"M. Rambaud, Andrei Tonkikh, Mark Abspoel\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/3560829.3563562\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"To be competitive with centralized applications, consensus protocols in blockchains must provide minimal latency while being able to scale to thousands of participants in order to preserve a high level of decentralization. A common way to minimize latency is to augment a consensus protocol with a fast track, which ensures that a decision is reached in just a couple of message delays in favorable conditions. However, it is a challenging task to preserve safety and good performance when these favorable conditions do not hold. To the best of our knowledge, all existing Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus protocols with fast tracks require view change protocols with quadratic authenticator complexity. In this paper, we provide the first solution to Byzantine consensus with fast track with a linear view change. The protocol incurs no asymptotic overhead over the baseline while reducing the latency in favorable conditions by a factor of 2. Our construction is based on a novel type of cryptographic proofs, which we call Proofs of Exclusivity (or PoE for short), which may be of independent interest. While our protocol for constructing a PoE comes at no extra costs in latency or asymptotic complexities, it does require some extra computation. To make sure that it does not impair the overall performance, we also show how to apply accountability and proofs of misbehavior in order to reduce to zero the overhead incurred by the computation of a PoE. More precisely, our mechanism guarantees that whenever this overhead is not zero, then automatically honest participants obtain a publicly verifiable proof that a well-identified malicious participant openly misbehaved. In this case, the overhead of computing a few extra threshold signatures for the Proof of Exclusivity can be seen as a relatively small price to get rid of a malicious participant.\",\"PeriodicalId\":182280,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings of the 2022 ACM Workshop on Developments in Consensus\",\"volume\":\"5 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-11-07\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings of the 2022 ACM Workshop on Developments in Consensus\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/3560829.3563562\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 2022 ACM Workshop on Developments in Consensus","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3560829.3563562","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3

摘要

为了与集中式应用程序竞争,区块链中的共识协议必须提供最小的延迟,同时能够扩展到数千个参与者,以保持高度的去中心化。最小化延迟的一种常见方法是使用快速通道来增强共识协议,这确保在有利的条件下,仅在几个消息延迟中达成决策。然而,当这些有利条件不具备时,如何保持安全性和良好的性能是一项具有挑战性的任务。据我们所知,所有现有的具有快速通道的拜占庭容错共识协议都需要具有二次验证器复杂性的视图更改协议。在本文中,我们提供了具有线性视图变化的快速通道的拜占庭共识的第一个解决方案。该协议不会在基线上产生渐近开销,同时在有利条件下将延迟减少了2倍。我们的构建基于一种新型的加密证明,我们称之为排他性证明(简称PoE),它可能具有独立的兴趣。虽然我们用于构建PoE的协议在延迟或渐近复杂性方面没有额外的成本,但它确实需要一些额外的计算。为了确保它不会损害整体性能,我们还展示了如何应用问责制和不当行为证明,以便将PoE计算所产生的开销减少到零。更准确地说,我们的机制保证,只要这个开销不为零,那么诚实的参与者就会自动获得一个公开可验证的证据,证明一个识别良好的恶意参与者公开行为不当。在这种情况下,为排他性证明计算一些额外阈值签名的开销可以被视为摆脱恶意参与者的相对较小的代价。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Linear View Change in Optimistically Fast BFT
To be competitive with centralized applications, consensus protocols in blockchains must provide minimal latency while being able to scale to thousands of participants in order to preserve a high level of decentralization. A common way to minimize latency is to augment a consensus protocol with a fast track, which ensures that a decision is reached in just a couple of message delays in favorable conditions. However, it is a challenging task to preserve safety and good performance when these favorable conditions do not hold. To the best of our knowledge, all existing Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus protocols with fast tracks require view change protocols with quadratic authenticator complexity. In this paper, we provide the first solution to Byzantine consensus with fast track with a linear view change. The protocol incurs no asymptotic overhead over the baseline while reducing the latency in favorable conditions by a factor of 2. Our construction is based on a novel type of cryptographic proofs, which we call Proofs of Exclusivity (or PoE for short), which may be of independent interest. While our protocol for constructing a PoE comes at no extra costs in latency or asymptotic complexities, it does require some extra computation. To make sure that it does not impair the overall performance, we also show how to apply accountability and proofs of misbehavior in order to reduce to zero the overhead incurred by the computation of a PoE. More precisely, our mechanism guarantees that whenever this overhead is not zero, then automatically honest participants obtain a publicly verifiable proof that a well-identified malicious participant openly misbehaved. In this case, the overhead of computing a few extra threshold signatures for the Proof of Exclusivity can be seen as a relatively small price to get rid of a malicious participant.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信