强制执行交易与重要性要求——trulia后仅披露和解的未来

Hao Jiang
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摘要

在该案中,特拉华州衡平法院打破了常规批准仅披露和解协议的传统,要求披露必须是实质性的,以解决原告律师与原告集体之间的利益冲突。我认为,和解的公平性是批准集体诉讼和解的唯一标准,要求实质性是无法实现公平的。根据董事会的受托责任,股东在法律上有权获得所有重要信息。因此,重大披露是法律义务的执行,不考虑股东索赔的释放。另一方面,如果谈判过程是公平和真诚地进行的,公平可以通过执行交易来实现。代理问题和原告律师与原告集体之间的利益冲突可以通过基于原告律师努力程度的司法评估是否有充分的代表,以及根据完善的适当律师费量化的三尺度体系给予适当的律师费奖励来解决。此外,根据欺诈和不负责任的合同原则,如果此类和解是通过欺诈手段促成的,或者与披露所带来的利益相比,披露的内容过于宽泛,则可以撤销过于宽泛的披露。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Enforcing the Bargain v. Materiality Requirement — The Future of Disclosure-Only Settlements Post-Trulia
In in re Trulia, Delaware Court of Chancery broke away from its tradition of routinely approving disclosure-only settlements and required disclosures to be material in order to cure the conflict of interest between plaintiff counsel and plaintiff class. I argue that fairness of settlement is the only standard in approving class action settlements and fairness will not be achieved by requiring materiality. Shareholders are legally entitled to all material information, as board’s fiduciary duty dictates. Thus, material disclosures are enforcement of a legal duty that is no consideration for the release of shareholder claims. On the other hand, fairness could be achieved by enforcing the bargain if bargaining process was conducted fairly and in good faith. The agency problem and the conflict of interest between plaintiff counsel and plaintiff class can be resolved by judicial assessment on whether there was adequate representation based on the effort of the plaintiff counsel and the appropriate attorney fee award according to the well-established three-scale system in quantifying the appropriate attorney fees. In addition, overbroad releases can be rescinded under the contract doctrines of fraud and unconscionability if such settlements were fraudulently induced or the release is overbroad compared to the benefit that the disclosures conveyed.
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