{"title":"最佳破产法:对一些人来说是一个新的开始","authors":"Grey Gordon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2494888","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"What is the optimal consumer bankruptcy law? I examine this question in the context of an incomplete markets lifecycle model with a planner who can choose state-contingent bankruptcy costs. I develop two key theoretical characterizations. First, the optimal policy has a bang-bang property: The planner either gives a household a \"fresh start\" or forbids it from filing. Second, it is optimal for the planner to always allow bankruptcy if the household cannot repay or would prefer an outside option. Consequently, a natural borrowing limit economy - an economy where bankruptcy is never allowed - is suboptimal. Quantitatively, the optimal policy results in large amounts of debt and default with ex-ante welfare gains, relative to a no-borrowing economy, as large as 12.8% of lifetime consumption. While the optimal policy is complicated, a simple cutoff rule allowing bankruptcy when a household's debt is 2.6 times its endowment results in a welfare gain of 12.2%.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"5","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Optimal Bankruptcy Code: A Fresh Start for Some\",\"authors\":\"Grey Gordon\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2494888\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"What is the optimal consumer bankruptcy law? I examine this question in the context of an incomplete markets lifecycle model with a planner who can choose state-contingent bankruptcy costs. I develop two key theoretical characterizations. First, the optimal policy has a bang-bang property: The planner either gives a household a \\\"fresh start\\\" or forbids it from filing. Second, it is optimal for the planner to always allow bankruptcy if the household cannot repay or would prefer an outside option. Consequently, a natural borrowing limit economy - an economy where bankruptcy is never allowed - is suboptimal. Quantitatively, the optimal policy results in large amounts of debt and default with ex-ante welfare gains, relative to a no-borrowing economy, as large as 12.8% of lifetime consumption. While the optimal policy is complicated, a simple cutoff rule allowing bankruptcy when a household's debt is 2.6 times its endowment results in a welfare gain of 12.2%.\",\"PeriodicalId\":138725,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"9 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2014-09-08\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"5\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2494888\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2494888","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
What is the optimal consumer bankruptcy law? I examine this question in the context of an incomplete markets lifecycle model with a planner who can choose state-contingent bankruptcy costs. I develop two key theoretical characterizations. First, the optimal policy has a bang-bang property: The planner either gives a household a "fresh start" or forbids it from filing. Second, it is optimal for the planner to always allow bankruptcy if the household cannot repay or would prefer an outside option. Consequently, a natural borrowing limit economy - an economy where bankruptcy is never allowed - is suboptimal. Quantitatively, the optimal policy results in large amounts of debt and default with ex-ante welfare gains, relative to a no-borrowing economy, as large as 12.8% of lifetime consumption. While the optimal policy is complicated, a simple cutoff rule allowing bankruptcy when a household's debt is 2.6 times its endowment results in a welfare gain of 12.2%.