{"title":"管理风险承担与CEO超额薪酬","authors":"Rahat Jafri, Samir Trabelsi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2379166","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines risk taking and CEO excess compensation problems in U.S firms to determine their impact on shareholders wealth. Literature suggests a positive effect of CEO incentive risk and strong corporate governance on CEO risk taking. Furthermore, the strong governance mitigates excess compensation problem. Controlling for governance quality and incentive risk, we provide empirical evidence of a significant association between risk taking and CEO excess compensation. When we also control for pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and feedback effects of incentive compensation on CEO risk taking, we find that higher use of incentive pay encourages risk taking, and due to a high exposure to risk CEOs draws excess compensation. Furthermore, we find that the excess compensation problem is more serious with CEOs taking high risk than with those taking low risk. Finally, we find that CEO risk taking also has structural impacts on CEO compensation.","PeriodicalId":382675,"journal":{"name":"Concurrent Sessions","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-01-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Managerial Risk-Taking and CEO Excess Compensation\",\"authors\":\"Rahat Jafri, Samir Trabelsi\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2379166\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper examines risk taking and CEO excess compensation problems in U.S firms to determine their impact on shareholders wealth. Literature suggests a positive effect of CEO incentive risk and strong corporate governance on CEO risk taking. Furthermore, the strong governance mitigates excess compensation problem. Controlling for governance quality and incentive risk, we provide empirical evidence of a significant association between risk taking and CEO excess compensation. When we also control for pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and feedback effects of incentive compensation on CEO risk taking, we find that higher use of incentive pay encourages risk taking, and due to a high exposure to risk CEOs draws excess compensation. Furthermore, we find that the excess compensation problem is more serious with CEOs taking high risk than with those taking low risk. Finally, we find that CEO risk taking also has structural impacts on CEO compensation.\",\"PeriodicalId\":382675,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Concurrent Sessions\",\"volume\":\"31 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2014-01-14\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Concurrent Sessions\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2379166\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Concurrent Sessions","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2379166","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Managerial Risk-Taking and CEO Excess Compensation
This paper examines risk taking and CEO excess compensation problems in U.S firms to determine their impact on shareholders wealth. Literature suggests a positive effect of CEO incentive risk and strong corporate governance on CEO risk taking. Furthermore, the strong governance mitigates excess compensation problem. Controlling for governance quality and incentive risk, we provide empirical evidence of a significant association between risk taking and CEO excess compensation. When we also control for pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and feedback effects of incentive compensation on CEO risk taking, we find that higher use of incentive pay encourages risk taking, and due to a high exposure to risk CEOs draws excess compensation. Furthermore, we find that the excess compensation problem is more serious with CEOs taking high risk than with those taking low risk. Finally, we find that CEO risk taking also has structural impacts on CEO compensation.
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