回顾过去的故意无知:评估证明银行内部个人洗钱知识的故意无视主义的价值

Hernán Blanco
{"title":"回顾过去的故意无知:评估证明银行内部个人洗钱知识的故意无视主义的价值","authors":"Hernán Blanco","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2408998","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Despite the revelation of grave, widespread violations of existing money laundering statutes within some of the biggest banks in the world, the United States’ authorities have refrained from prosecuting those banks and/or their top executives. One of the reasons behind this reluctance may lay on the difficulty in proving the executives’ knowledge as to the illegal origin of the funds involved in the prohibited transactions. With respect to that, the willful blindness doctrine may be useful as a logical tool for prosecutors, allowing them to attribute the scienter requirement in money laundering statutes (“knowledge”) to individual wrongdoers. To that effect, the two main formulations of the willful blindness doctrine that coexist among courts and commentators (willful blindness as a substitute for knowledge – willful blindness as proof of knowledge) are analyzed in order to determine which of them can be used without infringing on the principle of legality, which elements have to be present for the willful blindness to be effectively used, and if (and how) it might apply to the facts of the money laundering cases in which the banks were involved.Also, the use of the willful blindness doctrine in cases where a duty to know exists is analyzed in light of the modern German Law doctrine of “Infraction of Duty Crimes”, in order to ascertain if the violation of the obligated subjects duty to obtain the relevant information can trigger criminal responsibility for money laundering even if it results in a lack of criminal knowledge, as required in the money laundering statutes.","PeriodicalId":245576,"journal":{"name":"CSR & Management Practice eJournal","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Looking Past Contrived Ignorance: Assessing the Value of the Willful Blindness Doctrine to Prove Individual Knowledge of Money Laundering within Banks\",\"authors\":\"Hernán Blanco\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2408998\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Despite the revelation of grave, widespread violations of existing money laundering statutes within some of the biggest banks in the world, the United States’ authorities have refrained from prosecuting those banks and/or their top executives. One of the reasons behind this reluctance may lay on the difficulty in proving the executives’ knowledge as to the illegal origin of the funds involved in the prohibited transactions. With respect to that, the willful blindness doctrine may be useful as a logical tool for prosecutors, allowing them to attribute the scienter requirement in money laundering statutes (“knowledge”) to individual wrongdoers. To that effect, the two main formulations of the willful blindness doctrine that coexist among courts and commentators (willful blindness as a substitute for knowledge – willful blindness as proof of knowledge) are analyzed in order to determine which of them can be used without infringing on the principle of legality, which elements have to be present for the willful blindness to be effectively used, and if (and how) it might apply to the facts of the money laundering cases in which the banks were involved.Also, the use of the willful blindness doctrine in cases where a duty to know exists is analyzed in light of the modern German Law doctrine of “Infraction of Duty Crimes”, in order to ascertain if the violation of the obligated subjects duty to obtain the relevant information can trigger criminal responsibility for money laundering even if it results in a lack of criminal knowledge, as required in the money laundering statutes.\",\"PeriodicalId\":245576,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"CSR & Management Practice eJournal\",\"volume\":\"20 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2014-03-14\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"CSR & Management Practice eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2408998\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"CSR & Management Practice eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2408998","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

尽管世界上一些最大的银行普遍存在严重违反现行洗钱法规的行为,但美国当局一直没有起诉这些银行和/或其高管。这种不情愿背后的原因之一可能是难以证明高管们知道被禁止交易中涉及的资金的非法来源。在这方面,故意视而不见原则可能是检察官的一种有用的逻辑工具,使他们能够将洗钱法规中的科学要求(“知识”)归因于个别违法者。为此,本文分析了法院和评论家之间共存的故意无视原则的两种主要表述(故意无视作为知识的替代品-故意无视作为知识的证明),以确定其中哪一种可以在不违反合法性原则的情况下使用,哪些要素必须存在才能有效地使用故意无视原则。以及它是否(以及如何)适用于银行参与的洗钱案件的事实。同时,结合现代德国法律的“违反职务犯罪”原则,分析了在存在知道义务的情况下故意无视原则的运用,以确定违反义务主体获取相关信息的义务,即使导致缺乏洗钱法规所要求的犯罪知识,是否也会引发洗钱刑事责任。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Looking Past Contrived Ignorance: Assessing the Value of the Willful Blindness Doctrine to Prove Individual Knowledge of Money Laundering within Banks
Despite the revelation of grave, widespread violations of existing money laundering statutes within some of the biggest banks in the world, the United States’ authorities have refrained from prosecuting those banks and/or their top executives. One of the reasons behind this reluctance may lay on the difficulty in proving the executives’ knowledge as to the illegal origin of the funds involved in the prohibited transactions. With respect to that, the willful blindness doctrine may be useful as a logical tool for prosecutors, allowing them to attribute the scienter requirement in money laundering statutes (“knowledge”) to individual wrongdoers. To that effect, the two main formulations of the willful blindness doctrine that coexist among courts and commentators (willful blindness as a substitute for knowledge – willful blindness as proof of knowledge) are analyzed in order to determine which of them can be used without infringing on the principle of legality, which elements have to be present for the willful blindness to be effectively used, and if (and how) it might apply to the facts of the money laundering cases in which the banks were involved.Also, the use of the willful blindness doctrine in cases where a duty to know exists is analyzed in light of the modern German Law doctrine of “Infraction of Duty Crimes”, in order to ascertain if the violation of the obligated subjects duty to obtain the relevant information can trigger criminal responsibility for money laundering even if it results in a lack of criminal knowledge, as required in the money laundering statutes.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信