{"title":"评论回复","authors":"S. Shiffrin","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190084486.003.0008","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter responds to the commentaries by Kolodny, Brooks, and Stilz by elaborating on and adding to points made in the first three chapters. In connection with Chapter 1, it addresses various aspects of the requirement to communicate respect, including the collective character of the required communication, the effectiveness and appropriateness of law as its form, the need for equal participation in crafting it, and the possibility of individual dissent from it. It also considers whether the communicative conception offers a plausible normative account of the motivations underlying democratic movements. In connection with Chapters 2 and 3, it expands on the democratic character of common law and defends the claim that states may pursue discretionary interests, arguing that this pursuit is compatible not only with specific requirements of justice but also with liberalism.","PeriodicalId":143544,"journal":{"name":"Democratic Law","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Replies to Commentators\",\"authors\":\"S. Shiffrin\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/oso/9780190084486.003.0008\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This chapter responds to the commentaries by Kolodny, Brooks, and Stilz by elaborating on and adding to points made in the first three chapters. In connection with Chapter 1, it addresses various aspects of the requirement to communicate respect, including the collective character of the required communication, the effectiveness and appropriateness of law as its form, the need for equal participation in crafting it, and the possibility of individual dissent from it. It also considers whether the communicative conception offers a plausible normative account of the motivations underlying democratic movements. In connection with Chapters 2 and 3, it expands on the democratic character of common law and defends the claim that states may pursue discretionary interests, arguing that this pursuit is compatible not only with specific requirements of justice but also with liberalism.\",\"PeriodicalId\":143544,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Democratic Law\",\"volume\":\"25 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-10-21\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Democratic Law\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190084486.003.0008\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Democratic Law","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190084486.003.0008","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter responds to the commentaries by Kolodny, Brooks, and Stilz by elaborating on and adding to points made in the first three chapters. In connection with Chapter 1, it addresses various aspects of the requirement to communicate respect, including the collective character of the required communication, the effectiveness and appropriateness of law as its form, the need for equal participation in crafting it, and the possibility of individual dissent from it. It also considers whether the communicative conception offers a plausible normative account of the motivations underlying democratic movements. In connection with Chapters 2 and 3, it expands on the democratic character of common law and defends the claim that states may pursue discretionary interests, arguing that this pursuit is compatible not only with specific requirements of justice but also with liberalism.