激进无神论与“时间的原始物质性”

Martin Hägglund
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引用次数: 6

摘要

(罗伯特·金采访了马丁·赫格伦。金博士把他的问题集中在激进无神论的影响和时间的“原始物质性”上。r.k.:激进无神论的接受有没有把你的研究推向任何令人惊讶的方向?h.h.:最令人惊讶的事情,至少对我来说,首先是这本书产生了如此多的反响。对激进无神论的接受远远超出了我的预期,我深深感激它挑战我的方式来完善我的思想和发展我的论点。感谢那些谨慎而苛刻的受访者,我不仅有机会强调我的干预的利害关系;我还被迫去追求那些在我以前的工作中没有得到充分解决或没有得到充分解决的问题。从康奈尔大学的“激进无神论的挑战”会议开始,到牛津大学的“道德、好客和激进无神论”研讨会,再到哈佛大学的“德里达与宗教”会议,我有幸与书中的核心对话者进行了直接辩论。这些辩论反过来又促进了关于这本书的书面交流,这继续激励着我目前的工作。撇开关于德里达学术的具体争论不谈,我想强调两种问题,这两种问题是最难解决的,也是最有成效的。第一条线索是关于我的论证中轨迹结构的地位,第二条线索是关于欲望的概念,我称之为激进无神论。r.k.:你能多谈谈这两种问题吗?你如何看待它们与大陆哲学的其他发展的交集?马赫:第一个问题与大陆哲学中越来越明显的一个趋势有关,即从对语言和话语问题的关注转向对真实、物质和生物问题的重新关注。如果说索绪尔和语言学曾经是一个强制性的参考点,那么达尔文和进化论越来越占据了类似的位置。随着这种发展,德里达的作品在很大程度上被视为陷入了语言转向的泥潭,或者被抵押给了一种伦理和宗教虔诚,这使得它没有资源来参与科学和物质存在的问题。然而,正如我在《激进无神论》中所说的那样,这种对解构主义的评估是严重误导的。在《论语法》中,德里达不仅从语言学和现象学的角度,而且从自然科学的角度阐述了他的关键概念“痕迹”。我在这里的关键观点是,德里达根据时间和空间的一般共同含义来定义轨迹:它指定了时间的形成空间和空间的形成时间,德里达将其缩写为间隔(空间)。在德里达看来,间隔是有生命和无生命的条件,是理想和物质的条件。那么,问题是如何使这种对轨迹结构的概括合法化。说痕迹不仅是语言和经验的条件,而且是超越人类甚至生命的过程的条件,在方法论上的理由是什么?在“激进无神论的挑战”会议上,亨利·斯塔顿以其特有的敏锐,第一个对这个问题提出了压力,我在过去两年的大部分时间里都在寻求一个准确的答案。r.k.:那么在你的工作中,你是如何回应方法论论证这个问题的?马赫:我认为,需要的区别是逻辑和本体论之间的区别(在这里,我也受到了罗西奥·桑布拉纳关于黑格尔的著作的影响)。轨迹不是一种本体论的规定,而是一种逻辑结构,它明确了继承概念中隐含的东西。...
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Radical Atheism and “The Arche-Materiality of Time”
(Robert King interviewed Martin Hagglund. Dr. King focused his questions on the impact of Radical Atheism and the "arche-materiality" of time). R.K.: Did the reception of Radical Atheism push your research in any surprising directions? M.H.: The most surprising thing, at least for me, is first of all how much response the book has generated. The reception of Radical Atheism has gone far beyond anything I expected and I am deeply grateful for the ways in which it has challenged me to refine my thinking and develop my arguments. Thanks to careful and demanding respondents, I have not only been given the chance to press home the stakes of my intervention; I have also been pushed to pursue issues that were either underdeveloped or inadequately addressed in my previous work. Beginning with The Challenge of Radical Atheism conference at Cornell and continuing with the colloquium on Ethics, Hospitality and Radical Atheism at Oxford as well as the Derrida and Religion conference at Harvard, I have had the good fortune to engage in direct debate with central interlocutors of the book. These debates have in turn informed the written exchanges about the book, which continue to inspire my current work. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Leaving aside the specific polemics about Derrida scholarship, I would emphasize two strands of questioning that have been both the most difficult and the most productive to address. The first strand concerns the status of the structure of the trace in my argument, while the second concerns the conception of desire that informs what I call radical atheism. R.K.: Could you say more about these two strands of questioning? And how do you see them intersecting with other developments in Continental Philosophy? M.H.: The first strand of questioning can be situated in relation to a trend that is increasingly visible in Continental Philosophy, namely, a turn away from the focus on questions of language and discourse in favor of a renewed interest in questions of the real, the material, and the biological. If Saussure and linguistics once were an obligatory reference point, Darwin and evolutionary theory have increasingly come to occupy a similar position. In the wake of this development, Derrida's work is largely seen as mired in the linguistic turn or as mortgaged to an ethical and religious piety that leaves it without resources to engage the sciences and the question of material being. As I argue in Radical Atheism, however, such an assessment of deconstruction is deeply misleading. Already in Of Grammatology Derrida articulates his key notion of "the trace" in terms of not only linguistics and phenomenology but also natural science. My crucial point here is that Derrida defines the trace in terms of a general co-implication of time and space: it designates the becoming-space of time and the becoming-time of space, which Derrida abbreviates as spacing (espacement). Spacing is according to Derrida the condition for both the animate and the inanimate, both the ideal and the material. The question, then, is how one can legitimize such a generalization of the structure of the trace. What is the methodological justification for speaking of the trace as a condition for not only language and experience but also processes that extend beyond the human and even the living? With his characteristic incisiveness, Henry Staten was the first to put pressure on this question at The Challenge of Radical Atheism conference and I have spent much of the past two years seeking to work out a precise answer. R.K.: So how have you responded to this question of methodological justification in your work? M.H.: The distinction that is needed, I have come to contend, is one between the logical and the ontological (and here I am also influenced by Rocio Zambrana's work on Hegel). The trace is not an ontological stipulation but rather a logical structure that makes explicit what is implicit in the concept of succession. …
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