作为金融看涨期权的集体诉讼

Guy Halfteck
{"title":"作为金融看涨期权的集体诉讼","authors":"Guy Halfteck","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.528043","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Class action law enforcement is a resource-intensive undertaking, requiring investment of both intellectual capital and financial wherewithal. Building on insights developed in the economic theory of investment under uncertainty, the key theoretical proposition is that class action law enforcement comprises a multi-stage sequence of investment opportunities under conditions of multi-dimensional uncertainty. The properties of investment in class actions include (i) investment expenditures; (ii) future rewards on investment; (iii) multi-dimensional investment uncertainty; (iv) the irreversibility of investment expenditures; and (v) the sequential, multi-stage property of investment opportunities and investment decisions. The court appointment of class counsel is modeled as a judicially-granted monopoly over investment in class action law enforcement. At any given stage of the sequence (but for the last one), plaintiffs' attorneys and, later, court-appointed class counsel are faced with a financial call option, namely, an opportunity to invest and buy, with some probability, the opportunity to invest in the stage that follows in the sequence. Plaintiffs' attorneys' and, subsequently, the court-appointed class counsel's incentives to invest and investment decisions throughout the sequence are overwhelmingly the most important determinant of the magnitude of liability exposure. These theoretical propositions provide the most conceptually-inclusive model of the incentive structure of class action law enforcement. This analytic model is conceptually-inclusive because the myriad decisions made by plaintiffs' attorneys and, subsequently, by class counsel in the course of class action law enforcement are perceived as sequential investment decisions under conditions of uncertainty. Thus, virtually any aspect relating to the conduct and performance of plaintiffs' attorneys becomes amenable to analysis as a sequential investment problem. Normative implications concerning the design of investment-oriented, welfare-enhancing regulation of class action law enforcement across different areas of law where class actions are used as an enforcement mechanism are derived.","PeriodicalId":168354,"journal":{"name":"Torts & Products Liability Law","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2004-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Class Action as a Financial Call Option\",\"authors\":\"Guy Halfteck\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.528043\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Class action law enforcement is a resource-intensive undertaking, requiring investment of both intellectual capital and financial wherewithal. Building on insights developed in the economic theory of investment under uncertainty, the key theoretical proposition is that class action law enforcement comprises a multi-stage sequence of investment opportunities under conditions of multi-dimensional uncertainty. The properties of investment in class actions include (i) investment expenditures; (ii) future rewards on investment; (iii) multi-dimensional investment uncertainty; (iv) the irreversibility of investment expenditures; and (v) the sequential, multi-stage property of investment opportunities and investment decisions. The court appointment of class counsel is modeled as a judicially-granted monopoly over investment in class action law enforcement. At any given stage of the sequence (but for the last one), plaintiffs' attorneys and, later, court-appointed class counsel are faced with a financial call option, namely, an opportunity to invest and buy, with some probability, the opportunity to invest in the stage that follows in the sequence. Plaintiffs' attorneys' and, subsequently, the court-appointed class counsel's incentives to invest and investment decisions throughout the sequence are overwhelmingly the most important determinant of the magnitude of liability exposure. These theoretical propositions provide the most conceptually-inclusive model of the incentive structure of class action law enforcement. This analytic model is conceptually-inclusive because the myriad decisions made by plaintiffs' attorneys and, subsequently, by class counsel in the course of class action law enforcement are perceived as sequential investment decisions under conditions of uncertainty. Thus, virtually any aspect relating to the conduct and performance of plaintiffs' attorneys becomes amenable to analysis as a sequential investment problem. Normative implications concerning the design of investment-oriented, welfare-enhancing regulation of class action law enforcement across different areas of law where class actions are used as an enforcement mechanism are derived.\",\"PeriodicalId\":168354,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Torts & Products Liability Law\",\"volume\":\"9 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2004-03-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Torts & Products Liability Law\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.528043\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Torts & Products Liability Law","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.528043","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3

摘要

集体诉讼执法是一项资源密集的工作,需要智力资本和财政资金的投入。基于不确定性下投资经济理论的见解,关键的理论命题是,集体诉讼执法包括多维不确定性条件下的多阶段投资机会序列。集体诉讼中的投资属性包括:(i)投资支出;(二)未来投资回报;(三)多维度投资不确定性;(四)投资支出的不可逆性;(5)投资机会和投资决策的序贯性、多阶段性。法院任命集体律师的模式是司法授予对集体诉讼执法投资的垄断。在序列的任何给定阶段(但最后一个阶段除外),原告律师以及后来法院指定的集体律师都面临财务看涨期权,即投资和购买的机会,在一定概率下,有机会投资于序列中的下一个阶段。原告律师以及随后法院指定的集体律师在整个诉讼过程中的投资动机和投资决策,绝对是决定责任暴露程度的最重要因素。这些理论命题提供了最具概念包容性的集体诉讼执法激励结构模型。这一分析模型具有概念包容性,因为原告律师以及随后的集体法律顾问在集体诉讼执法过程中做出的无数决定被视为不确定条件下的连续投资决策。因此,几乎与原告律师的行为和表现有关的任何方面都可以作为连续投资问题进行分析。在使用集体诉讼作为执行机制的不同法律领域中,关于设计以投资为导向、提高福利的集体诉讼执法监管的规范性含义得到了推导。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Class Action as a Financial Call Option
Class action law enforcement is a resource-intensive undertaking, requiring investment of both intellectual capital and financial wherewithal. Building on insights developed in the economic theory of investment under uncertainty, the key theoretical proposition is that class action law enforcement comprises a multi-stage sequence of investment opportunities under conditions of multi-dimensional uncertainty. The properties of investment in class actions include (i) investment expenditures; (ii) future rewards on investment; (iii) multi-dimensional investment uncertainty; (iv) the irreversibility of investment expenditures; and (v) the sequential, multi-stage property of investment opportunities and investment decisions. The court appointment of class counsel is modeled as a judicially-granted monopoly over investment in class action law enforcement. At any given stage of the sequence (but for the last one), plaintiffs' attorneys and, later, court-appointed class counsel are faced with a financial call option, namely, an opportunity to invest and buy, with some probability, the opportunity to invest in the stage that follows in the sequence. Plaintiffs' attorneys' and, subsequently, the court-appointed class counsel's incentives to invest and investment decisions throughout the sequence are overwhelmingly the most important determinant of the magnitude of liability exposure. These theoretical propositions provide the most conceptually-inclusive model of the incentive structure of class action law enforcement. This analytic model is conceptually-inclusive because the myriad decisions made by plaintiffs' attorneys and, subsequently, by class counsel in the course of class action law enforcement are perceived as sequential investment decisions under conditions of uncertainty. Thus, virtually any aspect relating to the conduct and performance of plaintiffs' attorneys becomes amenable to analysis as a sequential investment problem. Normative implications concerning the design of investment-oriented, welfare-enhancing regulation of class action law enforcement across different areas of law where class actions are used as an enforcement mechanism are derived.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信