南非和朝鲜战争,政治介入

N. V. D. Waag-Cowling
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引用次数: 0

摘要

南非联邦在朝鲜战争中的军事介入是一场政治演习,而不是具有重大军事意义的演习。从1948年起,南非新成立的右翼民族主义阿非利卡政府就开始了一项种族政策的立法政策,这很快被称为种族隔离政策。这个新政府主要代表的是仍然深受英布战争创伤的人民。因此,许多阿非利卡人不想参与任何他们认为是英国战争的外部冲突。因此,南非的外交政策发生了明显而果断的转变,与简·斯穆茨(Jan Smuts)领导下的上届政府的外交政策截然不同,上届政府的外交政策与英国和其他英联邦领地大体一致。因此,朝鲜战争使国民党陷入了某种进退两难的境地。他们确实希望积极促进与美国的更牢固的关系,但不想卷入与英联邦的任何军事冒险。使这一问题更加复杂的是,国民党政府认为南非被剥夺公民权的黑人多数日益增长的不满情绪是其主要的安全威胁。因此,南非政府最初不愿对联合国在韩国的努力作出任何具体承诺是可以解释的。从地理上看,韩国远离南非的势力范围;此外,这是一场联邦无法承受的冲突。南非在第二次世界大战期间做出了巨大的财政牺牲,为英国的战争机器做出了远远超出其实际能力的贡献,而且在很大程度上仍处于战后紧缩的控制之下。尽管这些因素结合在一起,减轻了南非对朝鲜的介入,以及国民政府对朝鲜危机的早期孤立主义立场,但大约两个月后,随后政策的一个明显而突然的转变,证明了国民政府对军事介入对南非的潜在好处有了某种姗姗来迟的认识。这些好处包括南非政府希望与美国建立联系,并被纳入一项与北约相当的正式区域条约,同时要求购买某些军事硬件。这三个目标被认为是这种相当突然的外交政策偏离的主要原因。本讨论将集中于提供一些洞察南非政府如何试图利用朝鲜战争作为杠杆,以实现这些外交政策目标。关键词:SALO,冷战,非洲国防组织,联合国,南非空军
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
South Africa and the Korean War, the politics of involvement
The Union of South Africa’s military involvement in the Korean War was an exercise in political maneuvering as opposed to one of any great military significance. 1 South Africa’s new right wing Nationalist Afrikaner government had, from 1948, embarked on a policy of legislating its racial policies, soon to be known as Apartheid. This new government primarily represented a people who were still deeply scarred by the Anglo Boer War. Many Afrikaners consequently wanted no part in any external conflicts that they viewed as Britain’s wars. South Africa’s foreign policy therefore became subject to an obvious and decisive shift away from that of the previous government under Jan Smuts, which had been broadly in line with that of Britain and the other Commonwealth dominions. 2 The Korean War therefore presented the Nationalists with something of a dilemma. They did want to actively promote a stronger relationship with the United States but did not want to become involved in any military ventures with the British Commonwealth. Compounding this problem was the fact that the Nationalist government had identified the growing discontent of South Africa’s disenfranchised Black majority as her major security threat. The initial unwillingness of the South African government to commit anything tangible to the United Nations effort in Korea was therefore explicable. Geographically, Korea fell far outside of South Africa’s sphere of influence; furthermore this was a conflict which the Union could ill afford. 3 South Africa had made massive financial sacrifices during the Second World War with contributions to the British war machine that were far beyond her actual reach and was very much still in the grip of post war austerity. Despite these factors combining to mitigate against South African involvement in Korea and the early isolationist stance of the Nationalist government regarding the Korean crisis, a noticeable and abrupt shift in subsequent policy some two months later bears witness to the theory that the Nationalist government underwent some sort of epiphany with a belated realization as to the potential benefits of military involvement for South Africa. These benefits included the desire of the South African government to be associated with the United States and be included in a formal regional treaty comparable to NATO together with the requirement for the acquisition of certain military hardware. These three aims have been postulated as the principle reason for this rather abrupt foreign policy deviation. This discussion will focus on providing some insight into how the South African government attempted to use the Korean War as a lever in order to attain these foreign policy objectives Keywords: SALO, Cold War, African Defence Organisation, United Nations, South African Air Force
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