Deploying Panpsychism for the Demarcation of Panentheism

The recent literature on panentheism often starts with two claims. First, one is reminded of the recent popularity of the term ›panentheism‹ across philosophy of religion, systematic theology, the comparative study of world religions, science and religion, and naturalistic spirituality.1 Through numbers, if not through arguments, »the panentheistic turn« is presented as »a doctrinal revolution«, which cannot be ignored by either critics or sympathisers.2 Second, one is presented with a problem; namely, that no one knows exactly what panentheism means or how it can be demarcated from similar views— even demarcated from the very view panentheism is commonly pitted against, namely classical theism. The central claims of panentheism, which are often used to define the position, are that ›the world is the body of God‹ and ›the world is in God‹. In order to avoid predetermining whether these phrases should be taken literally or metaphorically, I refer to these claims throughout this paper as ›the panentheistic slogans‹. These slogans are evocative but cannot illuminate panentheism’s distinctive claims regarding God’s relationship to the world without further analysis. As a result, there is a growing collection of secondary literature seeking to interpret these slogans in a way that clearly demarcates panentheism from neighbouring theological positions.3 This paper contributes to this secondary literature. However, there are also scholars who criticise the search for a clear demarcation for missing the point of panentheism entirely.4 As Thomas C. Owen notes, some panentheists seem to view the fluidity or vagueness of their position as part of its attraction.5 The implication is that the gathering together of