敌意收购还是友好合并?:实物期权分析

Takeshi Ebina, Yuya Kumakura, K. Nishide
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引用次数: 3

摘要

本文分析了两家面临不同但相关的利润不确定性的企业并购的实物期权模型。假设企业可以选择两种方案;敌意收购或友好合并。在敌意并购中,竞标方获得了所有的额外价值,但产生了收购成本;而在友好并购中,双方不承担收购成本,但通过纳什议价分享了额外价值。我们展示了需求不确定性和收购成本如何影响哪一家公司更有可能作为竞标者,以及哪种形式的合并将出现。我们还发现,小公司可能以敌对的方式成为大公司的竞标者,这在实际市场中偶尔会观察到。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Hostile Takeovers or Friendly Mergers?: A Real Options Analysis
This study analyzes a real options model of mergers and takeovers between two firms facing different but correlated uncertainty in profits. It is assumed that firms can choose two alternatives; hostile takeover or friendly merger. In a hostile takeover, a bidder firm takes all the extra value but incurs takeover costs, while in a friendly merger, both firms do not bear takeover costs but share the extra value through Nash bargaining. We show how demand uncertainty and takeover costs influence which firm is more likely to act as a bidder and which form of amalgamation will emerge. We also find that a smaller firm can be a bidder to a larger firm in a hostile manner, which is occasionally observed in actual markets.
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