网路搜寻家:真实的网路浏览行为

Daisy Reyes, Eno Dynowski, T. Chovan, John Mikos, Eric Chan-Tin, M. Abuhamad, S. Kennison
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引用次数: 0

摘要

随着人们对隐私问题的日益关注,诸如vpn和Tor之类的匿名工具变得流行起来。然而,数据包元数据,如数据包大小和数据包数量,仍然可以被攻击者观察到。这通常被称为指纹和网站指纹攻击最近受到了很多关注,因为已知受害者的网站访问可以被准确预测,从而使受害者的网络使用去匿名化。之前的大部分工作都是在实验室环境中进行的,并做出了两个假设:1)受害者一次访问一个网站,2)整个网站访问的所有网络数据包都可以观察到。为了验证这些假设,一个名为“网路搜寻家”的新私人网络浏览器扩展被真实用户部署。“网络搜寻家”记录访问过的网站,网站加载开始的时间,以及网站加载结束的时间。结果显示,用户的浏览模式与之前假设的不同。由于多个网站同时重叠和下载,用户可能会以一种对抗网站指纹的方式浏览网页。超过15%的网站与至少一个其他网站重叠,每次重叠时间为66秒。此外,每次重叠发生在第一个网站下载开始后大约9秒。因此,这加强了之前的一些工作,即网站的开始比网站指纹攻击的结束更重要。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
WebTracker: Real Webbrowsing Behaviors
With increased privacy concerns, anonymity tools such as VPNs and Tor have become popular. However, the packet metadata such as the packet size and number of packets can still be observed by an adversary. This is commonly known as fingerprinting and website fingerprinting attacks have received a lot of attention recently as a known victim’s website visits can be accurately predicted, deanonymizing that victim’s web usage. Most of the previous work have been performed in laboratory settings and have made two assumptions: 1) a victim visits one website at a time, and 2) the whole website visit with all the network packets can be observed. To validate these assumptions, a new private webbrowser extension called WebTracker is deployed with real users. WebTracker records the websites visited, when the website loading starts, and when the website loading finishes. Results show that users’ browsing patterns are different than what was previously assumed. Users may browse the web in a way that acts as a countermeasure against website fingerprinting due to multiple websites overlapping and downloading at the same time. Over 15% of websites overlap with at least one other website and each overlap was 66 seconds. Moreover, each overlap happens roughly 9 seconds after the first website download has started. Thus, this reinforces some previous work that the beginning of a website is more important than the end for a website fingerprinting attack.
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