The Tortured Path to Strategic Failure

This chapter discusses the decisions which led to the strategic failure of the US intervention in Iraq, arguing that such failure was the byproduct of a series of bad decisions rather than predetermined. Specifically, the most consequential sets of decisions which contributed to the mission's ultimate failure were the decision to begin the conflict with an inadequate postwar plan, the irrational decisions made in the aftermath of the collapse of the Iraq state, the decision to pursue the transition strategy for two years, the decision to not intervene against electoral abuses in 2010, and the decision to withdraw without a residual force. The United States' inability to craft a strategy that deterred or responded to external malignant actors compounded the effects of those poor decisions. In spite of all the strategic, operational, and tactical mistakes it made, the US nearly was able to achieve a semblance of success as a result of a new strategy nicknamed "the Surge." That temporary success, however, ultimately collapsed under the weight of previous errors that had run out political support for the mission and because of a series of further errors.