存在时间成本的一般均衡

Johannes Ebert
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引用次数: 0

摘要

如果消费需要时间,而时间是有限的,那么除了消费者的支出约束外,还存在时间约束。这可能会导致一种形式的满足,即消费者无法消费他们购买的所有商品。建立了有时间约束条件下竞争均衡的存在性,恢复了第一福利定理和第二福利定理的一个版本。虽然所有均衡都是弱帕累托最优的,但它们可能不是强帕累托最优的:从满足的消费者那里取钱,给不满足的消费者,会增加社会福利。我们给出了一个具有相同消费者的例子,其中相等份额是唯一的强帕累托最优配置,并且应该由计划者选择最大化社会福利。我们还对伊斯特林悖论提出了一个简单的解释。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
General Equilibrium in the Presence of Time Costs
If consumption takes time, and time is limited, there exists a time constraint in addition to the expenditure constraint of a consumer. This may lead to a form of satiation, where consumers cannot consume all commodities they purchase. We establish existence of competitive equilibrium in the presence of a time constraint and recover a version of the first and second welfare theorem. While all equilibria are weakly Pareto-optimal, they may fail to be strongly Pareto-optimal: taking from satiated consumers and giving to non-satiated consumers increases social welfare. We give an example with identical consumers, where equal share is the only strongly Pareto-optimal allocation and should be chosen by a planner maximizing social welfare. We also suggest a simple explanation for the Easterlin Paradox.
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