集体受托人

L. Roth
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引用次数: 1

摘要

受托人能否为公共目标服务?根据《患者保护和平价医疗法案》(" ACA "),全民获得医疗保险的运动要求我们把重点放在提供医疗保健服务的大型组织与其所服务的人群之间的信托关系上。这些关系已经成为一项集体事业,而不是直接的个人关系。在这篇文章中,我介绍了集体受托人的概念,以响应在健康保险和医疗保健领域向统一的国家目标的转变。只有通过集体方式,我们才能让受托人对许多人的福利负责,而不是对一个或几个人的福利负责。虽然其他学者关注的是由受托人控制其财富或健康的个人,但这使得收集有关信托行为的信息以及从受托人那里获得一致和连贯的决定变得困难。我的观点是,这不是一个可以在个人受托人或个人受益人层面上解决的问题。我研究了受托人的作用的扩大,这是美国对私人福利日益增长的需求的结果。我在这里关心的是医疗保险的扩大和医疗福利的管理。如果患者得不到福利,那么他们实际上就被剥夺了获得服务的机会。到目前为止,由于政府的选择和在政策方向上缺乏共识,政府在很大程度上一直处于缺席状态,受托人的个人决定加在一起,构成了为私人利益而存在的唯一大规模政策。除非ERISA的信托制度(我在本文中重点讨论的例子)被改变,否则受托人可以也将撤销ACA扩大医疗保健覆盖面的目标。尽管我探索了几种可能的解决方案,但我最终认为,只有在政府行为者监督和限制福利要求的拒绝时,信托义务才有意义。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Collective Fiduciary
Can fiduciaries be made to serve public goals? The movement under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) towards universal access to health insurance requires us to focus on the fiduciary relationships between large organizations providing access to healthcare and the populations they serve. These relationships have become a collective undertaking instead of a direct, personal relationship. In this Article, I introduce the concept of the collective fiduciary in response to the shift towards uniform, national goals in the realm of health insurance and healthcare. Only through a collective approach can we hold fiduciaries accountable for the welfare of many instead of one or a few individuals. While other scholars have focused on the individual whose fortunes or health are controlled by a fiduciary, this has made it difficult to collect information about fiduciary actions and obtain consistent and coherent decisions from fiduciaries. My argument here is that this is not a problem that can be fixed at the level of the individual fiduciary or individual beneficiary. I examine the expansion of the role of the fiduciary as a result of growing demand for private welfare benefits in the United States. My concern here is with the expansion of health insurance and the administration of health benefits. If patients are denied benefits, then they are effectively denied access to service providers. In a space where the government has been, until now, largely absent both by choice and because of a lack of agreement on policy direction, individual decisions by fiduciaries add up to the only large scale policy existing for private benefits. Fiduciaries can and will undo the goal of expanding access to healthcare under the ACA unless ERISA’s fiduciary regime (the example I focus on in this Article) is altered. Though I explore several possible solutions, I ultimately argue that fiduciary duties are only meaningful when denials of benefit claims are supervised and capped by government actors.
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